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Introduction
In the Palace of the Vatican, on a wall of a room called stanza della segnatura,
the visitor encounters the fresco The School of Athens created by the famous re-
naissance painter Raphael around 1509. It shows renowned representatives of the
ancient artes liberales led by philosophy. Right in the center of this masterpiece,
one finds the certainly most brilliant greek philosophers (besides Socrates): Plato
and Aristotle. While Plato points up indicating his belief in the primacy of ideas
situated in a higher world of forms, Aristotle holds his hand palm downwards
suggesting a more grounded epistemic view, where real world facts (or in modern
terms: the data) govern the way how concepts and classifications are formed.
These two perspectives can be traced through the entire occidental philosophy
occurring here and there in varying guises (cf. also the problem of universals or
the bipolar setting rationalism vs. empirism brought up in the 19th century).
These antagonistic approaches personified by the two philosophers seem also char-
acteristic for the underlying ways of thinking in two fields of knowledge processing
and representation, we want to deal with in our work: Formal Concept Analysis
(FCA) and Description Logic (DL).
The – more Aristotelian – mathematical theory of Formal Concept Analysis came
into being some twenty years ago as the attempt to model (hierarchies of) con-
cepts in terms of lattice theory. It is based on the dualistic understanding of
concepts as consisting of concept extent (i.e., all entities belonging to that con-
cept) and concept intent (i.e., all attributes characterizing it).
FCA has proven solid in theory but also quite intuitive in representing conceptual
knowledge, also for mathematically less skilled people. Thus, it has been success-
fully applied in various areas beyond mathematics. Besides this representational
capabilities, algorithms assisting knowledge acquisition have been developed, im-
plemented and used in practice.
In recent years, FCA has been developed further and extended by the project
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of contextual logic, widening the scope of interest from concepts to judgments.
In the course of these developments, the relational aspect has been increasingly
emphasized.
Description Logics being a collective term for a family of knowledge representation
formalisms are the result of a development starting in the 1970s with frame based
systems and semantic networks.
The common underlying idea is to characterize classes of entities (resp. objects)
of a domain and organize them hierarchically. In this, the similarities to FCA
become apparent. However – thus identifying this approach as a Platonic one –
for forming those hierarchies and characterizing classes by using so called termi-
nologies, DL does not presuppose any knowledge about concrete domain entities.
Moreover, from the very beginning, DL has put great emphasis on the relation-
ships between the described classes – beyond the subclass-superclass relationship
induced by the hierarchical ordering.
A guiding principle in this research was to combine logical expressiveness with
computationally effective automated reasoning (as a minimal demand, reasoning
should always be decidable).
In turn, this led to the development and implementation of computationally
optimized reasoning algorithms for highly expressive logics, which is certainly
one of the main reasons for the fact that DL formalisms are well established in
practice and constitute the foundations of nowadays Semantic Web standards
(cf. OWL – the web ontology language).
In this work, we want to exploit synergies between the two described research
areas and show how results from either field can be mutually fruitful for both dis-
ciplines. We use DL formalisms for defining FCA attributes and FCA exploration
techniques to obtain or refine DL Knowledge Representation specifications. More
generally, DL exploits FCA techniques for interactive knowledge acquisition and
FCA benefits from DL in terms of expressing relational knowledge.
Relational information can be found everywhere. Therefore, it is essential for
instances dealing with knowledge – be it human beings or knowledge processing
systems – not only to conceptually classify entities of a domain of discourse as
isolated objects, but also to describe the interrelationships among them. Conse-
quently, relational properties are commonly used in human conceptual thinking
9
to define new concepts, as everyday terms like “wife”, “mother”, “son” (as well
as all terms describing relatives), “disciplinarian”, or “neighbor” demonstrate.
Consequently, relational information is also a considerable fraction of human back-
ground knowledge which constitutes the basis of human communication, knowl-
edge common to most people due to similar physical or sociocultural experiences.
Yet, obviously, this kind of knowledge can not be presupposed in any kind of
computer based knowledge processing system – it would have to be explicitly
specified. Respective attempts, first addressed within the scope of AI research,
anew gained importance as the Semantic Web idea evolved. In these areas, such
specifications are usually referred to as ontologies.
Clearly, the process of conceptually specifying a domain cannot dispense of hu-
man contribution. However, although all information needed in order to describe
a domain is in general implicitly present, its explicit formal specification may nev-
ertheless be tedious for the expert. Moreover, it might remain unclear, whether
a specification is complete, i.e., whether all specifiable information valid in the
considered domain is indeed contained in the specification.
Hence, it would be beneficial to dispose of a method that organizes and structures
the specification process by successively asking single questions to the domain
expert in a way which minimizes the expert’s effort (in particular, it does not
ask redundant questions) and guarantees that the resulting specification will be
complete in the sense stated above.
In our work, we present such an algorithm for relational exploration.
Chapter 1 introduces elementary notions of FCA with focus on attribute logic
and the technique of attribute exploration which will play a major role in our
further considerations.
Chapter 2 gives basic notions and definitions referring to a particular DL denoted
by FLE . Some of these notions are slightly adapted to a more FCA-apt point of
view, some even uncommon to DL, but useful for developing our results.
Chapter 3 – certainly containing the deepest mathematical results of our work
– deals with cumulated clauses, expressions commonly used in FCA to specify
background knowledge. We present a deduction calculus for cumulated clauses
on FLE and prove its soundness and completeness. Moreover, we show how the
corresponding results can be even used to define an algorithm to decide entailment
of this kind of cumulated clauses.
Chapter 4 introduces DL expressions as attributes into FCA and shows the cor-
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respondence between DL class inclusions and implications on special formal con-
texts. Thus, it justifies the goal to use FCA techniques to obtain DL shaped
axioms valid in an investigated domain. We provide the theoretical foundations
for a successive exploration on FLE .
Emerging from these results, a corresponding algorithm will be summarized and
explicitly described in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 addresses the question whether the previously described knowledge
acquisition procedure terminates after finitely many steps. A necessary and suf-
ficient criterion for this case will be provided.
Chapter 7 gives a simple mathematical example, demonstrating how the algo-
rithm can be applied.
Chapter 8 tries to give an impression how the described methods and techniques
can be applied in practice, namely in the field of ontology creation and refinement,
by supplying a means for the structured search for domain axioms.
Chapter 9 finally sketches some possible ways how the results and methods
achieved in this work can be generalized and extended by future (resp. already
ongoing) research.
We try to give an intuitive understanding of our definitions, theorems, and proofs
wherever possible. Nevertheless, we wanted to be absolutely precise in our proofs.
Therefore, some passages might seem somewhat formal, technical, or too de-
tailed. So, we beg your understanding for our decision to favor accurateness
above smoothness.
Some last remarks concerning the layout of this work: As usual, Theorems and
Definitions are differentiated from the regular text by italics. Additionally, we
have put the proofs into a smaller font without serifs in order to assist orientation
in the text. So, it should be possible to identify the function of a paragraph on
the first glance and possibly skip passages that are obvious or too technical.
Chapter 1
Formal Concept Analysis and
Attribute Exploration: Basic
Notions
In Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), the terms concept and conceptual hierarchy
are mathematically formulated, based on the philosophical ideas of intension and
extension (as brought up by the Logic of Port-Royal, Pascal, and Leibniz). It
thereby develops conceptual thinking in terms of lattice theory (for the classical
representation, see [Bi67]). The results exert significant influence on the scientific
areas of conceptual data analysis and knowledge processing. Many of them can be
(and have been) implemented and used in practice. An especially useful technique
is the attribute exploration algorithm (see e.g. [Ga84] and [Ga87]).
In this chapter, we will briefly sketch the basic terminology of FCA as well as
known results that are important for our further work, mainly following the FCA
standard reference [GaWi99b].
1.1 Closure Operators
Closure operators are nearly ubiquitous in FCA and constitute a basic notion be-
ing extensively used throughout this work. The closure of a set can be understood
as a minimal extension of it in order to fulfill certain properties.
Definition 1.1 Let M be an arbitrary set. A function cl : P(M) → P(M) will
be called closure operator on M if it is
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1. extensive, i.e., A ⊆ cl(A) for all A ⊆ M ,
2. monotone, i.e., A ⊆ B ⇒ cl(A) ⊆ cl(B) for all A, B ⊆ M , and
3. idempotent, i.e., cl(cl(A)) = cl(A) for all A ⊆ M .
A set A ⊆ M will be called closed (or cl-closed in case of ambiguity), if
cl(A) = A.
The set of all closed sets {A | A = cl(A) ⊆ M} will be called closure system.
❑
It is easy to show that for an arbitrary closure system S, the corresponding
closure operator cl can be reconstructed by
cl(A) =
⋂
B∈S,A⊆B
B.
So there is a one-to-one connection between a closure operator and the accordant
closure system.
1.2 Formal Contexts and Formal Concepts
Everything in Formal Concept Analysis starts from formal contexts. These math-
ematical structures are used in practice to describe various kinds of data. They
can be visualized and understood as so called cross tables. For given objects and
attributes, the cross table indicates which objects have which attributes. Mathe-
matically, this correspondency is expressed by a binary relation:
Definition 1.2 A formal context K is a triple (G, M, I) with
• an arbitrary set G called objects,
• an arbitrary set M called attributes,
• a relation I ⊆ G × M called incidence relation
We read gIm as: “object g has attribute m”. ❑
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This basic data structure now can be used to define operations on sets of objects
or attributes, respectively.
Definition 1.3 Let K = (G, M, I) be a formal context. We define a function
(.)I : P(G) → P(M) with
G̃I := {m | gIm for all g ∈ G̃}
for G̃ ⊆ G. Furthermore, we use the same notation to define the function (.)I :
P(M) → P(G) where
M̃ I := {g | gIm for all m ∈ M̃}
for M̃ ⊆ M .
For convenience, we sometimes write gI instead of {g}I and mI instead of {m}I .
❑
Applied to an object set, this function yields all attributes common to these
objects; by applying it to an attribute set we get the set of all objects having
those attributes. The following facts are consequences of the above definitions:
• (.)II is a closure operator on G as well as on M .
• For A ⊆ G, AI is a (.)II-closed set and dually
• for B ⊆ M , BI is a (.)II-closed set.
The next definition shows how a conceptual hierarchy can be built from a formal
context.
Definition 1.4 Given a formal context K = (G, M, I) a formal concept is
a pair (A, B) with A ⊆ G, B ⊆ M , A = BI , and B = AI .
We call the set A extent and the set B intent of the concept (A, B).
Let (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) be formal concepts of a formal context. We call (A1, B1)
a subconcept of (A2, B2) (written: (A1, B1) ≤ (A2, B2)) if A1 ⊆ A2. Then,
(A2, B2) will be called superconcept of (A1, B1). ❑
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It is well known from FCA that the set of all formal concepts of a formal context
together with the subconcept-superconcept-order form a complete lattice, the so
called concept lattice. Infimum and supremum therein can be calculated by
∧
t∈T
(At, Bt) =

⋂
t∈T
At,
(
⋃
t∈T
Bt
)II

∨
t∈T
(At, Bt) =


(
⋃
t∈T
At
)II
,
⋂
t∈T
Bt

 .
1.3 Implications
In this section, we will briefly introduce the basics of attribute logic. Given a set
of attributes, implications on that set are logical expressions that can be used
to describe certain attribute correspondencies which are valid for all objects of a
formal context.
Definition 1.5 Let M be an arbitrary set. An implication on M is a pair
(A, B) with A, B ⊆ M . To support intuition we write A_B instead of (A, B).
We say an implication A_B holds for an attribute set C (also: C respects
A_B), if A 6⊆ C or B ⊆ C. Moreover, an implication i holds (or: is valid)
in a formal context K = (G, M, I) if it holds for all sets gI with g ∈ G. We then
write K |= i.
The implicational theory Thimp(K) of a formal context K = (G, M, I) is the
set of all implications that hold in K.
Given a set A ⊆ M and a set I of implications on M , we write AI for the smallest
set that
• contains A and
• respects all implications from I.
(Since those two requirements are preserved under intersection, the existence of
a smallest such set is assured).1 ❑
1 Note that this notation differs from that in [GaWi99b]. It has been chosen for better
readability.
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It is obvious that for any set I of implications on M , (.)I is a closure operator
on M . Furthermore, it can be easily shown that an implication A_B is valid in
a formal context K = (G, M, I) exactly if B ⊆ AII .
Definition 1.6 We say an implication i follows (semantically) from a set
I of implications on M , if any subset of M that respects all implications from I
also respects i. ❑
It is well known that an implication i follows semantically from an implication
set I exactly if i is derivable from I via the Armstrong rules (see [Ar74]).2
Definition 1.7 The Armstrong rules for implications on a set M are the
following:
X _X
identity
X _Y
X ∪ Z _Y
premise extension
X _Y Y ∪ Z _W
X ∪ Z _W
substitution
with W, X, Y, Z ⊆ M . ❑
In [DoGa84], it has been shown that semantical entailment of implications can
be decided in linear time with respect to the cardinality of I. This also enables
the fast calculation of AI for a given A ⊆ M . One natural question is that for a
minimal set of implications that generates (in terms of semantical entailment) a
given implicational theory (e.g. that of a formal context). The precise definition
of that notion will be given by the next definition.
Definition 1.8 An implication set I will be called non-redundant, if for any
i ∈ I we have that i does not follow semantically from I \ {i}.
An implication set I of a context K will be called complete if every implication
valid in K follows semantically from I.
I will be called an implicational base of a formal context K if it is non-
redundant and complete. ❑
2We assume the reader to be familiar with the notion and notation of deduction rules.
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In the sequel, a way to construct a canonical implicational base for a given formal
context is described. The notion of pseudo-intent is needed for this.
Definition 1.9 For a formal context K = (G, M, I), a set P ⊆ M will be called
pseudo-intent if P II 6= P and QII ⊆ P holds for every pseudo-intent Q ( P .
❑
Note that this definition is recursive. Since the set M is always assumed to be
finite in the sequel, it is nevertheless correct.3 With this notion, a canonical
implicational base can be easily described (see [GuDu86] or [Du87]).
Theorem 1.10 For a given formal context K, the set
L := {P _P II | P pseudo-intent}
is an implicational base.
This result justifies to call the implication set L stem base of K. This par-
ticular implicational base is successively constructed in the attribute exploration
algorithm which will be described in the next section. Before, we will cite some
results needed to justify this algorithm.
Lemma 1.11 The set of all intents and pseudo-intents of a formal context con-
stitutes a closure system.
The corresponding closure operator clQ for this closure system can be described
by
clQ(P ) :=
⋃
n∈N
Pn
with P0 := P and
Pn+1 := Pn ∪
⋃
Pseudointent Q⊂Pn
QII .
Definition 1.12 Let (M,≺) be an arbitrary linear strict order and cl a closure
operator on M . Then we define for A, B ⊆ M and m ∈ M :
A ⊕ m := cl((A ∩ {a | a ≺ m}) ∪ {m})
A <m B :⇔ m ∈ B \ A and A ∩ {a | a ≺ m} = B ∩ {a | a ≺ m}
A < B :⇔ A <m B for one m ∈ M
Obviously, (Pfin(M), <) is a linear strict order, which we will call the lectic
order. ❑
3 However, for the applicability of this definition, also weaker conditions than finiteness are
sufficient.
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In the sequel, if we speak of the lectic order on subsets of M , we think of the
lectic order with respect to an arbitrary (but fixed) linear strict order on M .
Note that – irrespective of how ≺ is chosen – (Pfin(M), <) is always a linearization
of the strict order (Pfin(M),⊂), i.e., A ⊂ B implies A < B for any A, B ⊆ M .
The next lemma provides a way to enumerate all intents and pseudo-intents of a
formal context in lectic order using the closure operator defined above.
Lemma 1.13 The lectically smallest intent or pseudo-intent is ∅. Given a set P ,
the lectically next intent or pseudo-intent can be determined as follows: find the
(with respect to ≺) maximal m ∈ M such that P ∩ {a | a ≺ m} = (P ⊕m) ∩ {a |
a ≺ m} (where ⊕ is defined with respect to clQ). If this exists, P ⊕ m is the
lectically next intent or pseudo-intent, otherwise there is no intent or pseudo-
intent lectically greater than P .
By defining the lectic order in the way we did, we ensure the following: When
a certain set A ∈ M is checked for clQ-closedness all pseudo-intents P ( A
have already been determined before. Thus the closedness checking can be done
without recursion, if all previously determined pseudo-intents are stored.
The following lemma is essential for the attribute exploration technique as a
means of acquiring information in an interactive process. It shows that the lecti-
cally first n pseudo-intents keep this property if the underlying context is modified
(namely: extended) in a certain way.
Lemma 1.14 Let K = (G, M, I) be a context and let P1, . . . , Pn be the lectically
first n pseudo-intents of K. If we set K̃ := (G ∪ {g}, M, I ∪ (g × {M̃})) with
M̃ ⊆ M respecting all Pi _ P
II
i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n then those Pi are the lectically
first n pseudo-intents of K̃.
1.4 Attribute Exploration
In this section, we describe the basic attribute exploration algorithm. The aim
of this algorithm is to completely determine the implicational knowledge about
a certain domain (also called the universe).
We presuppose an instance – called the expert – possessing complete knowledge
about the universe and hence able to answer all questions about it. The attribute
exploration algorithm can be seen as an organized way to acquire the knowledge
by asking as few questions to the expert as possible.
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Note that attribute exploration is based on a kind of closed world assumption:
the expert is supposed to know all entities of the universe. Consequently, an
entity added to the universe a posteriori could radically change its implicational
theory.
1.4.1 Plain Attribute Exploration
The domain to explore is formalized as a formal context K = (U, M, I). Usually,
it is not known completely in advance. However, possibly, some entities of the
universe g ∈ G0 ⊆ U are already known, as well as their associated attributes g
I .
Let K := (G0, M, J0) with J0 = I ∩ (G0 × M).
Now, we start enumerating the intents and pseudo-intents of K as described in
Lemma 1.13 and present for every such set S with S 6= SJ0J0 the question “Does
the implication S _ SJ0J0 hold in the context K = (U, M, I)?” to the human
expert.
The expert might confirm this. In this case, S is a pseudo-intent of (U, M, I)
and therefore S _SJ0J0 is archived as part of K’s stem base L. We proceed the
enumeration with the pseudo-intent lectically next to S.
The other case would be that S _ SJ0J0 does not hold in (U, M, I). But then
there must exist a g ∈ U with S ∈ gI and SJ0J0 6∈ gI . The expert is asked to
input this g and gI , which is used to update the context K in the obvious way: we
set G1 := G0 ∪ {g} and J1 := J0 ∪ ({g}× gI). We continue the enumeration with
S (and J1 instead of J0). Notice that - thank to Lemma 1.14 - all information
that has been explored so far remains valid.
This procedure terminates when all pseudo-intents and intents have been enumer-
ated. Then, the implicational knowledge of the universe is completely acquired,
i.e., the closure operator (.)II coincides with (.)JnJn and (.)L.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the interactive exploration process.
1.4.2 Background Knowledge
Now, we will describe how we can deal with background knowledge. In general,
the term background knowledge denotes any information putting constraints on
K. In particular, this information may be non-implicational, which would prevent
a direct incorporation into the stem base. Nevertheless, such knowledge can have
an impact on the implicational theory, inasmuch as it could make implications
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G0 M J0
Gn M Jn
L0
Lk
K |= A_B ?
Yes!
Li+1 = Li ∪ {A_B}
Gi+1 = Gi ∪ {g}
Ji+1 = Ji ∪ {g} × gI
No, because of g!
≡
implications
a posterioria posteriori
context
Exploration
Attribute
context
a priori a priori
implications
domain expert
Question:
Figure 1.1: Scheme of the attribute exploration algorithm
follow from other implications even if they are not derivable using the Armstrong
rules.
Example 1.15 Let K := (G, M, I) with M := {a, b, c, d} and let be additionally
known that for any g ∈ G with gIa, we have gIb or gIc. Then, from the implica-
tion set {b_d, c_d} follows semantically the implication a_d (since in every
formal context with the above property whenever b_d and c_d hold also a_d
holds).
To incorporate background knowledge we would need an instance that is capable
of deciding whether an implication is entailed by the background knowledge and
the implicational knowledge acquired so far. Any implication asked by the enu-
meration algorithm described above would then first be passed to this decision
procedure. If the validity of this implication can be confirmed, it is just “silently”
added to the stem base. Otherwise, the question will be directed to the expert.
So in a certain way, the decision procedure is used as a strainer; only questions
not decidable by means of the knowledge already specified are asked.
Now, we will present two different ways how this can be realized.
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Test contexts.
First, observe that for K1 = (G1, M, I1) and K2 = (G2, M, I2) from {gI1 | g ∈
G1} = {gI2 | g ∈ G2}, it directly follows that Thimp(K1) = Thimp(K2). Thus, the
set {(M, M,∋) | M ⊆ P(M)} comprises all contexts different with respect to
their attribute logic. Background knowledge then can be used to decide, whether
a certain context (M, M,∋) possibly represents the universe (i.e., whether there
is a K = (G, M, I) compatible with all our background knowledge and {gI | g ∈
G} = M). In this case, M will be called non-contradictory.
Example 1.16 Let M be a set of attributes with m1, m2 ∈ M and let m2 be
“designed” to be the negation of m1, i.e., an object g is stipulated to have an
attribute m2 exactly if it has not the attribute m1. If this is the only restriction,
{(M, M,∋)} is non-contradictory if and only if for every M̃ ∈ M either m1 ∈ M̃
or m2 ∈ M̃ .
Now, consider the test context
K := (
⋃
{M | M non-contradictory}, M,∋).
Note that the object set of this context is not necessarily non-contradictory.
However, it is easy to see that an implication on M holds in this context if and
only if it holds in every context (M, M,∋) with non-contradictory M. Thus
we know Thimp(K) ⊆ Thimp(K). Every potential implication emerging from the
algorithm can then be checked against K and silently confirmed if found to be
valid therein.4
Note that, if the implicational knowledge about U increases (i.e., if the expert
confirms an implication during the exploration process), this influences the notion
of non-contradictoriness and therefore the test context has to be recalculated.
This way to decide background knowledge consequences can be seen as an ex-
tensional one: it takes into account all “possible worlds” with respect to a set of
constraints.
4 On the first glance, this explanation may seem unnecessarily overcomplicated. In fact, if the
non-contradictoriness of a context can be decided object-wise (i.e., for every object we can say
whether it is “admissible” independently from the presence or absence of any other object), the
test context can be defined directly. However, if the background knowledge contains restrictions
as for instance “either all objects have the attribute m1 or all objects have the attribute m2”,
we have to proceed like this.
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Reasoning procedures.
Another – intensional – way is to use a procedure that (given the complete back-
ground knowledge specified in some logical formalism) is capable of deciding
whether this background knowledge together with the formerly acquired implica-
tions entails the asked implication. One common example for such a formalism
are the so called cumulated clauses (a decision procedure for their entailment has
been presented in [Kr98]). Depending on the interpretation of the attributes,
also other algorithms (DL-reasoners, theorem provers, model checkers or logic
programs to name just a few) could be used for this task. In Chapter 3, we will
elaborate a way to provide such a method for cumulated clauses on a special kind
of attributes.
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Chapter 2
The Description Logic FLE:
Basic Notions
In this chapter, we will introduce the Description Logic notions necessary for
our work – for a detailed and concise treatise see [Ba03]. In general, the term
Description Logic comprises an amount of different formalisms which vary in
expressiveness and decision procedure complexity. This allows to use a certain
logic “tailored” to one’s needs in practice. The common principle for DLs is
to form complex concept descriptions out of simple ones using so called concept
constructors.
DL formalisms are used to represent terminological knowledge of an application
domain. Such a representation is usually called knowledge base and normally
consists of two parts: a so called TBox introducing a terminology and an ABox
containing assertions.
In the TBox, we can specify how concept descriptions are related to each other.
This allows to define concepts by other concepts as well as to state constraints
valid in the considered domain. The used formalism to do so are general concept
inclusion axioms – rules that have to hold throughout the domain. Nevertheless,
in the TBox, no propositions are made about specific entities of the domain.
Contrary, in the ABox, individuals are introduced and named. Furthermore
one can specify, which concept descriptions they belong to. However, one basic
maxim in DL is the open world assumption: the ABox is by no means thought
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of containing all entities of the described domain. It just demands the existence
of some distinguished ones.
In our work, we focus on the rather simple description logic FLE which includes
conjunction, existential and universal quantification. The reason to use this DL
for our work (besides the necessity to keep expressiveness low for complexity
reasons) is mainly psychological: We aim at an application where questions for-
mulated in a DL are asked to a human expert. As has been shown by numerous
studies (summarized in [Bo66]) a human’s capability of learning and using a par-
ticular concept (this concept’s psychological complexity) depends on its logical
form. As a central result, conjunctive concepts have been found subjectively
simpler than disjunctive ones. Likewise, negation has shown unfavorable in this
regard. Hence, by using FLE , the questions asked to the expert consist of compar-
atively intuitive concepts and can therefore be answered more easily. Moreover,
they probably represent facts which are more “interesting” for humans.
Consequently, we use FLE concept descriptions to describe the entities of a certain
domain. More precisely, we will employ the FLE formalism to define attributes
from a given structure with unary and binary predicates. This is also the reason
why we define notions of subsumption and equivalence with respect to one fixed
interpretation. Apart from these special notions and the restricted language
FLEnorm introduced in Section 2.2, we just recall well known basic DL notions in
this chapter.
2.1 The Language FLE: Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we will present a way of constructing so called concept descriptions
from two given attribute sets, which yields us the FLE language.
Definition 2.1 Let MC and MR be arbitrary finite sets the elements of which we
will call concept names1 and role names, respectively. By FLE(MC , MR)
(or shortly: FLE if there can be no confusion) we denote the set of concept
1Whenever in this work we use the term concept, we refer to the notion used in Description
Logic. If we want to refer to the meaning used in Formal Concept Analysis we use formal
concept.
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descriptions being inductively defined as follows:2
MC ∪ {⊤,⊥} ⊆ FLE
C, D ∈ FLE ⇒ C ⊓ D ∈ FLE
C ∈ FLE , R ∈ MR ⇒
E
R.C ∈ FLE
C ∈ FLE , R ∈ MR ⇒
A
R.C ∈ FLE
❑
Note (since literature is not uniform in this regard) that our definition of FLE
contains the bottom concept.
The next step after having defined the language of concept descriptions is to pro-
vide a semantics. In order to do this, we first define interpretations. In our case,
an interpretation is formalized as binary power context family. Although not the
usual way of representing an interpretation in DL, it is just a trivial reformulation
and – in our point of view – facilitates definitions and aids conceptual thinking
in this work.
Definition 2.2 Let ∆ be an arbitrary nonempty set called the universe. The
elements of the universe will be called entities. A binary power context
family
−→
K on ∆ is a pair (KC, KR) consisting of the formal contexts KC :=
(GC, MC, IC) and KR := (GR, MR, IR) with GC = ∆ and GR = ∆ × ∆.
Moreover, we assume MC and MR to be finite.
If for δ1, δ2 ∈ ∆ we have (δ1, δ2)IRR for some R ∈ MR, we call δ2 the R-neighbor
of δ1. ❑
Note that our notion of binary power context family is a special case of the power
context families used in FCA to encode relational structures (see e.g. [Wi97]). In
binary power context families, only unary and binary relations can be expressed.3
2 In DL terminology, it is usual to denote concept descriptions as well as role names by capital
letters. We decided to abide by this convention, but – in order to avoid possible confusion (with
other capital letters denoting sets) – we use typewriter font (A, B, C) for FLE concept descrip-
tions and calligraphic letters (A,B, C) for sets of concept descriptions. Furthermore, we use
the symbols
E
and
A
for “role quantification” to clearly distinguish them from the “ordinary”
quantifiers ∃ and ∀ occurring in some proofs and definitions.
3 Nevertheless, it is possible to deal with relations of higher arity by an adequate redefinition
of concept and role names as well as the way models are interpreted. This technique is called
reification (see [Ba03]).
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Note that there is a trivial one-to-one correspondence to Kripke structures (being
used as the usual models for modal logic, see e.g. [Bla01]) or labelled transition
systems with attributes (LTSA, see [GaRu01]).
Next, we describe an extensional semantics for the above defined concept descrip-
tions: for a given binary power context family
−→
K = ((∆, MC, IC), (∆×∆, MR, IR))
we assign to each concept description C ∈ FLE(MC , MR) a set A ∈ P(∆) of
entities4 that “fulfill” this concept description.
Definition 2.3 The interpretation function [[.]]−→
K
: FLE(MC, MR) → P(∆)
for a binary power context family
−→
K on a universe ∆ with attribute sets MC and
MR is defined recursively as follows:
[[⊤]]−→
K
:= ∆
[[⊥]]−→
K
:= ∅
[[m]]−→
K
:= mIC for all m ∈ MC
[[C ⊓ D]]−→
K
:= [[C]]−→
K
∩ [[D]]−→
K
[[
E
R.C]]−→
K
:= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∃δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR ∧ δ2 ∈ [[C]]−→K } for R ∈ MR
[[
A
R.C]]−→
K
:= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR → δ2 ∈ [[C]]−→K} for R ∈ MR.
For δ ∈ [[C]]−→
K
we will occasionally write δ |= C and say C is valid in δ. A whole
set C of concept descriptions is valid in δ (written: δ |= C) if δ |= C for all
C ∈ C.
A concept description D
−→
K-subsumes a concept description C (write: C ⊑−→
K
D) if
[[C]]−→
K
⊆ [[D]]−→
K
.
A concept description D subsumes a concept description C universally (write:
C ⊑ D) if C ⊑−→
K
D for all
−→
K with attribute sets MC and MR.
Two concept descriptions C and D are called
−→
K−equivalent (write: C ≡−→
K
D) if
C ⊑−→
K
D and D ⊑−→
K
C 5 and universally equivalent (write: C ≡ D) if this is the
case for all
−→
K with attribute sets MC and MR. ❑
Remark 2.4 It follows directly from the semantics definition that for any FLE
concept descriptions C, D, E the composed concept descriptions (C ⊓ D) ⊓ E and
C⊓ (D⊓ E) are universally equivalent. The same holds for C⊓ D and D⊓ C as well
as for C ⊓ C and C. In the sequel we will exploit these facts in several ways:
4Throughout this work, P will denote the powerset and Pfin the finite powerset.
5 As an immediate consequence we have C ≡−→
K
D exactly if [[C]]−→
K
= [[D]]−→
K
.
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• We will omit all parentheses which are not necessary.
• We will make extensive use of the following abbreviation:
Let C = {C1, . . . , Cn} be a finite set of FLE concept descriptions. Then the
concept description C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn will be abbreviated by
d
C. We extend
this definition in an intuitive way for |C| < 2 by setting
d
{C} := C and
d
∅ := ⊤. This “syntactic sugar” could then be directly incorporated into
the semantics by adding
[[
l
C]]−→
K
:=
⋂
C∈C
[[C]]−→
K
to Definition 2.3.
• We will consider all concept descriptions which can be transformed into
each other by the equivalences mentioned above as syntactically equal6, i.e.
we write for instance
(C ⊓ D) ⊓ E = (E ⊓ C) ⊓ D =
l
{C, D, E}.
A notion we will need in the sequel is the maximal role depth of an FLE concept
description, indicating how deep the role quantifiers
A
and
E
are nested in that
concept description. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 2.5 The maximal role depth of an FLE concept description is
given by the function rd : FLE → N recursively defined as follows:
rd(⊤) := 0
rd(⊥) := 0
rd(m) := 0 for all m ∈ MC
rd(C ⊓ D) := max(rd(C), rd(D))
rd(
E
R.C) := rd(C) + 1 for R ∈ MR
rd(
A
R.C) := rd(C) + 1 for R ∈ MR
For n ∈ N we define FLEn := {C | C ∈ FLE , rd(C) ≤ n}. ❑
6 We are aware that this argumentation is a bit inaccurate. Actually, we would have to
define an equivalence relation, say ≈, on FLE capturing the universal equivalence of the con-
cept descriptions mentioned above and subsequently consider the elements of the factorized
structure FLE/≈ as actual concept descriptions.
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Remark 2.6 Due to the facts that we treat conjunctions as syntactically equal
as explained in Remark 2.4 and we demand MC and MR to be finite, we can
conclude that for any n ∈ N there are only finitely many concept descriptions
with maximal role depth ≤ n.
2.2 FLEnorm – Reduced, yet Complete
Consider a binary power context family
−→
K and let δ be an entity from
−→
K . Then,
knowing that the concept descriptions C and D are valid in δ, we automatically
know that C ⊓ D is valid in δ as well. Therefore, one could ask for a “test set”
S ⊂ FLE with the following property: Knowing for every concept description
from S whether it is valid in δ allows to conclude for an arbitrary FLE concept
description whether it is valid in δ. We will define a concept description set
FLEnorm and show in the next theorem that it has this desired property.
Definition 2.7 The set FLEnorm of normalized FLE concept descrip-
tions is an FLE subset defined in the following way:
MC ∪ {⊥} ⊆ FLE
norm
C ∈ Pfin(FLE
norm),⊥ 6∈ C, R ∈ MR ⇒
E
R.
d
C ∈ FLEnorm
C ∈ FLEnorm, R ∈ MR ⇒
A
R.C ∈ FLEnorm
Additionally, for any i ∈ N let FLEnormi = FLE
norm ∩ FLE i. ❑
Theorem 2.8 For every FLE concept description C, there is a set C of FLEnorm
concept descriptions such that
C ≡
l
C.
Proof:
We define a function n : FLE → P(FLEnorm) in a recursive manner by
n(⊤) = ∅
n(⊥) = {⊥}
n(C) = {C} for C ∈ MC
n(
A
R.C) = {
A
R.D | D ∈ n(C)}
n(
E
R.C) =
{
{⊥} if ⊥ ∈ n(C){ E
R.
d
n(C) otherwise
n(
d
C) =
⋃
C∈C n(C)
that calculates C from C. We will prove C ≡
d
n(C) via induction on the maximal role depth of C:
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• [[⊤]]−→
K
= ∆ =
⋂
∅ = [[
d
{∅}]]−→
K
• [[⊥]]−→
K
= ∅ =
⋂
{∅} =
⋂
[[⊥]]−→
K
= [[
d
{⊥}]]−→
K
• [[C]]−→
K
= [[
d
{C}]]−→
K
. (Remember that this was the reason, why we identified these expressions
even syntactically in Remark 2.4.)
• [[
A
R.C]]−→
K
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR → δ2 ∈ [[C]]−→
K
}
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR → δ2 ∈ [[
d
n(C)]]−→
K
}
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ R
IR → δ2 ∈
⋂
D∈n(C) [[D]]−→K }
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR →
∧
D∈n(C) δ2 ∈ [[D]]−→K }
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ :
∧
D∈n(C)(δ1, δ2) ∈ R
IR → δ2 ∈ [[D]]−→
K
}
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ |
∧
D∈n(C) ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ R
IR → δ2 ∈ [[D]]−→
K
}
=
⋂
D∈n(C){δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∀δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ R
IR → δ2 ∈ [[D]]−→
K
}
=
⋂
D∈n(C) [[
A
R.D]]−→
K
= [[
d⋃
C∈C{
A
R.D | D ∈ n(C)}]]−→
K
• [[
E
R.C]]−→
K
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∃δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR ∧ δ2 ∈ [[C]]−→
K
}
Case 1: ⊥ 6∈
⋃
C∈C n(C)
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∃δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ R
IR ∧ δ2 ∈ [[
d⋃
C∈C n(C)]]−→K }
= [[
E
R.
d⋃
C∈C n(C)]]−→K
Case 2: ⊥ ∈
⋃
C∈C n(C)
= {δ1 ∈ ∆ | ∃δ2 ∈ ∆ : (δ1, δ2) ∈ RIR ∧ δ2 ∈ ∅}
= ∅
= [[⊥]]−→
K
• [[
d
C]]−→
K
=
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K
=
⋂
C∈C [[
d
n(C)]]−→
K
=
⋂
C∈C
⋂
{[[D]]−→
K
| D ∈ n(C)}
=
⋂
{
⋂
{[[D]]−→
K
| D ∈ n(C)} | C ∈ C}
=
⋂⋃
C∈C{[[D]]−→K | D ∈ n(C)}
= ∈
⋂
{[[χ]]−→
K
| χ ∈
⋃
C∈C n(C)}
= [[
d⋃
C∈C n(C)]]−→K
❑
Obviously, this theorem provides a way to check on the basis of the “test set”
FLEnorm whether δ |= C for any C ∈ FLE . This is the case exactly if n(C) ⊆
FLEnorm ∩ {D | δ |= D}.
This fact will prove helpful in the next sections since most of our considerations
and proofs will have to deal only with FLEnorm but will propagate to whole FLE .
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Chapter 3
Cumulated Clauses on FLEnorm
Cumulated clauses on attributes have been studied and used in FCA as a means of
specifying knowledge about interrelationships between attributes (see [GaWi99a]
and [Ga96]). A deduction calculus for cumulated clauses on logically opaque
attributes has been presented in [Kr98]. In particular, they have been used to
encode background knowledge for the attribute exploration process described in
Section 1.4. It can be easily shown that in the case of propositional logic any
logical formula can equivalently be expressed by a set of cumulated clauses on
the atomic propositions.
In this chapter, we will consider cumulated clauses on FLEnorm. The fact that
attributes of this kind have an internal logical structure exerts influence on the
corresponding clause logic. We will deal with these issues by presenting a sound
and complete deduction calculus as well as a decision procedure for the entailment
of cumulated clauses on FLEnorm.
3.1 Definition and Deduction Calculus
This section introduces the notion cumulated clause being a generalization of
implications as defined in Section 1.3. Furthermore, we will present a deduction
calculus for cumulated clauses on FLEnorm concept descriptions and show its
soundness and completeness.
Definition 3.1 Given an arbitrary set M , a cumulated clause on M is an
element from CC(M) := Pfin(M) ×PfinPfin(M).
To support intuition, we write A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn} instead of (A, {B1, . . . ,Bn}) for
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A,B1, . . . ,Bn ⊆ M and n ∈ N.
A set N ⊆ M is said to respect a cumulated clause A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn} if
A 6⊆ N or Bi ⊆ N for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A cumulated clause k on FLEnorm is said to be valid in a binary power context
family
−→
K (also:
−→
K respects k, written:
−→
K |= k), if for every δ ∈ ∆, the set
{C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→
K
} respects k.1
If a cumulated clause k is valid in every binary power context family that respects
all cumulated clauses from a certain set K, we say k follows semantically
from K (written K |= k). ❑
In words, the validity of the cumulated clause A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn} in a power con-
text family means that for every entity δ ∈ ∆ with δ |= A, we have additionally
δ |= B1 or δ |= B2 ... or δ |= Bn. Obviously, for n = 1, the notion of a cumulated
clause coincides with that of an implication.
Fact 3.2 A cumulated clause A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn} is valid in a binary power con-
text family
−→
K iff ⋂
A∈A
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
.
Proof:
We start with the definition of validity and show the equivalence to the statement above:
∀δ ∈ ∆ : A 6⊆ {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→
K
} ∨
∨
1≤i≤n Bi ⊆ {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→K }
⇐⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ : δ 6∈
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K ∨
∨
1≤i≤n δ ∈
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
⇐⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ : δ ∈
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K → δ ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
⇐⇒
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
.
❑
In the next definition, we present a deduction calculus on CC(FLEnorm). Infor-
mally, we could call this rules the “logic of case distinction on FLE” – disjunction
is not allowed to construct new concepts but can be used to express alternative
conclusions.
Definition 3.3 The set DR of derivation rules consists of the following
rules (with A, B, C ∈ FLEnorm and A,B1, . . . ,Bn, C,D1, . . . ,Dk ∈ Pfin(FLE
norm))
{⊥} ⊸ {{A}}
contradiction (CONT)
1 In the sequel, when using the term cumulated clause, we always mean cumulated clause
on FLEnorm.
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A ⊸ {A}
identity (ID)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ∪ {C} ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
premise extension (PE)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C}
conclusion extension (CE)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C} A ∪ C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn,D1, . . . ,Dk}
substitution (SUB)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
[
E
R]A ⊸ {[
E
R]B1, . . . , [
E
R]Bn}
E
-lifting (EL)
[
E
R]A ∪ {
A
R.B} ⊸ {[
E
R](A ∪ {B})}
A
-propagation (AP)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C}
[
A
R]A ⊸ {[
E
R]B1, . . . , [
E
R]Bn, [
A
R]C}
A
-lifting (AL)
where
[
A
R]A := {
A
R.A | A ∈ A}
and
[
E
R]A :=
{
{⊥}, if ⊥ ∈ A
{
E
R.
d
A} otherwise.2
Given a set K of cumulated clauses, we denote by DR(K) the smallest set of
cumulated clauses containing K and closed under the derivation rules above. For
k ∈ DR(K) we also write K ⊢ k. ❑
The rules ID, PE, CE and SUB have already been described in [Kr98] as deduction
rules for cumulated clauses on arbitrary sets. The CONT rule is valid in any
formal system, where “universal falsehood” can be expressed by an attribute. EL,
AP, and AL represent the interdependence of concept descriptions incorporating
A
R and
E
R. While the first two are quite intuitive, the last one takes a little
consideration.
2Note that in view of the semantics definition, we have
d
([
A
R]A) ≡
A
R.
d
A as well as
d
([
E
R]A) ≡
E
R.
d
A. Moreover, [
A
R]C and [
E
R]C are subsets of FLEnorm if C ⊆ FLEnorm.
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3.1.1 Soundness
The following theorem states the soundness of the presented deduction calculus
with respect to the semantics defined above. As usual, proving soundness is much
easier than showing completeness.
Theorem 3.4 For K ⊆ CC(FLEnorm) and k ∈ CC(FLEnorm), we have
K ⊢ k =⇒ K |= k.
Proof:
We will prove this by showing that for every derivation rule
K
k
∈ DR
with K ⊆ CC(FLEnorm) and k ∈ CC(FLEnorm) holds that every binary power context family
−→
K
respecting all cumulated clauses from K also respects k.
• contradiction
Given an arbitrary
−→
K , because of [[⊥]]−→
K
= ∅, no δ ∈ ∆ fulfills δ |= ⊥. So, δ |= ⊥ ⇒ δ |= A
is trivially true for every A ∈ FLEnorm.
• identity
In every
−→
K trivially holds δ |= A ⇒ δ |= A.
• premise extension
Take a
−→
K that respects A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}, i.e., (due to Fact 3.2)
⋂
A∈A
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
.
Obviously,
⋂
A∈A∪{C} [[A]]−→K ⊆
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K and thus
⋂
A∈A∪{c}
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
which means (again due to Fact 3.2) that A ∪ {C} ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn} is valid in
−→
K .
• conclusion extension
Take a
−→
K that respects A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}, i.e.,
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
. Obvi-
ously
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K and thus
⋂
A∈A
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C
[[C]]−→
K
which means that A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C} is valid in
−→
K .
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• substitution
If
−→
K respects A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C} and A ∪ C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}, this can be expressed as
⋂
A∈A
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C
[[C]]−→
K
and ⋂
A∈A∪C
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤k
⋂
D∈Di
[[D]]−→
K
.
But then we can conclude:
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
(⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K ∩
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K
)
=
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈A∪C [[C]]−→K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋃
1≤i≤k
⋂
D∈Di
[[D]]−→
K
which means that A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn,D1, . . . ,Dk} is valid in
−→
K .
•
E
-lifting
Let
−→
K respect A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}, i.e.,
⋂
A∈A
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
.
Then we have
[[
E
R.
d
A]]−→
K
= {δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K }
⊆ {δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
}
=
⋃
1≤i≤n{δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
}
=
⋃
1≤i≤n [[
E
R.
d
Bi]]−→
K
which means that [
E
R]A ⊸ {[
E
R]B1, . . . , [
E
R]Bn}.
•
A
-propagation
For an arbitrary
−→
K holds
[[
E
R.
d
A]]−→
K
∩ [[
A
R.B]]−→
K
= {δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K } ∩ {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈ [[B]]−→K }
⊆ {δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K ∧ δ̃ ∈ [[B]]−→K }
= {δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
A∈A∪{B} [[A]]−→K }
= [[
E
R.
d
A ∪ {B}]]−→
K
which means that [
E
R]A∪ {
A
R.B} ⊸ {[
E
R](A ∪ {B})}.
•
A
-lifting
Assume in
−→
K holds A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C} and therefore we have
⋂
A∈A
[[A]]−→
K
⊆
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C
[[C]]−→
K
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We now set ∆∗ := {δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR∧
∨
1≤i≤n δ̃ ∈
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
} and thereby get ∆ \∆∗ =
{δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR →
∧
1≤i≤n δ̃ 6∈
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
} Then also holds
⋂
A∈A [[
A
R.A]]−→
K
= {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈
⋂
A∈A [[A]]−→K }
⊆ {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K }
= (∆∗ ∪ (∆ \ ∆∗)) ∩ {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K }
⊆ ∆∗ ∪
(
(∆ \ ∆∗) ∩ {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
∪
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K }
)
⊆ ∆∗ ∪ {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K }
=
⋃
1≤i≤n{δ | ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
B∈Bi
[[B]]−→
K
} ∪ {δ | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K }
which means that [
A
R]A ⊸ {[
E
R]B1, . . . , [
E
R]Bn, [
A
R]C}.
❑
3.1.2 Some Derivations
Lemma 3.5 The following derivation rules can be deduced from DR:
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
cumulated premise extension (PE*)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C} C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn,D1, . . . ,Dk}
pure substitution (SUB*)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1 ∪ C, . . . ,Bn ∪ C}
restriction (RES)
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn} C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dm}
A ∪ C ⊸ {Bi ∪ Dj | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
distribution (D)
⊥ ⊸ {A}
cumulated contradiction (CONT*)
[
A
R]A ∪ [
E
R]B ⊸ {[
E
R](A ∪ B)}
cumulated
A
-propagation (AP*)
Proof:
The validity of these rules is proven by providing the DR proof trees that realize them.
1. cumulated premise extension
Let C = {C1, . . . , Ck}. Then we may iteratively add all elements of (the finite set) C to the
premise by PE:
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ∪ {C1} ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
PE
...
PE
A ∪ {C1, . . . , Ck} ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
PE
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2. pure substitution
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn, C}
C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
A ∪ C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
PE*
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn,D1, . . . ,Dk}
SUB
3. restriction
We start our derivation with
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
PE*
C ∪ B1 ⊸ {C ∪ B1}
ID
A∪ C ∪ B1 ⊸ {C ∪ B1}
PE*
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1 ∪ C,B2, . . . ,Bn}
SUB
and continue by successively “substituting” every Bi in the conclusion with Bi ∪ C, finishing
with
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1 ∪ C, . . . ,Bn−1 ∪ C,Bn}
C ∪ Bn ⊸ {C ∪ Bn}
ID
A ∪ C ∪ Bn ⊸ {C ∪ Bn}
PE*
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1 ∪ C, . . . ,Bn ∪ C}
SUB
4. distribution
We start the derivation with
A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
A ∪ C ⊸ {B1 ∪ C, . . . ,Bn ∪ C}
RES
C ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dm}
C ∪ B1 ⊸ {D1 ∪ B1, . . . ,Dm ∪ B1}
RES
A∪ C ⊸ {B1 ∪ D1, . . . ,B1 ∪Dm,B2 ∪ C, . . . ,Bn ∪ C}
SUB*
and in the same way, step by step substitute every Bi ∪ C in the conclusion with Bi ∪
D1, . . .Bi ∪ Dm. So indeed, we end up with
A ∪ C ⊸ {Bi ∪ Dj | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
5. cumulated contradiction
Let A = {A1, . . . , An}. Then
{⊥} ⊸ {{A1}}
CONT
{⊥} ⊸ {{A2}}
CONT
{⊥} ⊸ {{A1, A2}}
...
{⊥} ⊸ {{A1, . . . , An−1}}
D
D
D
{⊥} ⊸ {{An}}
CONT
{⊥} ⊸ {{A1, . . . , An}}
D
6. cumulated
A
-propagation
Again, let A = {A1, . . . , An}. Furthermore, let Ai = {Ak | 1 ≤ k ≤ i} for i ≤ n. For any
i < n, we have the following valid derivation tree:
{
A
R.Ai+1} ∪ [
E
.R](B ∪ Ai) ⊸ {[
E
R](B ∪ Ai+1)}
AP
[
A
R](A \ Ai) ∪ [
E
R](B ∪Ai) ⊸ {[
A
R](A \ Ai+1) ∪ [
E
R](B ∪ Ai+1)}
RES
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By setting Ci = [
A
R](A \ Ai) ∪ [
E
R](B ∪ Ai), the derivation tree mentioned above justifies
Ci ⊸ {Ci+1} for all 0 ≤ i < n. Now, we can successively apply pure substitution:
C0 ⊸ {C1} C1 ⊸ {C2}
C0 ⊸ {C2}
SUB*
...
C0 ⊸ {Cn−1}
SUB*
Cn−1 ⊸ {Cn}
C0 ⊸ {Cn}
SUB*
The conclusion of this derivation tree is just [
A
R]A∪ [
E
R]B ⊸ {[
E
R](A∪ B)}.
❑
Example 3.6 Let MC = ∅ and MR = {R}. Now, consider the proposition:
“Every entity has an R-neighbor or it has no R-neighbor.” This proposition is
clearly valid in any binary power context family. So, it should be the consequence
of the empty set, even if no additional cumulated clauses are known to hold.
Obviously, if an entity has an R-neighbor, it fulfills the FLE concept description
E
R.⊤ which is another notation for
E
R.
d
∅. By examining the definition, one
also finds that an entity fulfills
A
R.⊥ exactly if it has no R-neighbor.
So, we know
∅ |= ∅ ⊸ {{
E
R.
l
∅}, {
A
R.⊥}}.
Now, if DR is complete (which has not been shown yet, but will be on the next
pages), we should also have
∅ ⊢ ∅ ⊸ {{
E
R.
l
∅}, {
A
R.⊥}}.
And in fact, taking into account that [
A
R]∅ = ∅ by definition, we can do the
following derivation
∅ ⊸ {∅}
ID
∅ ⊸ {∅, {⊥}}
CE
∅ ⊸ {{
E
R.
l
∅}, {
A
R.⊥}}
AL
obtaining the expected result.
3.1.3 The Standard Model
After having shown the soundness of DR, it remains to prove its completeness.
This will be done in the following way: Given a set of cumulated clauses on
FLEnorm, we will define a particular binary power context family called the stan-
dard model which
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• respects all the given clauses and
• respects just those clauses being derivable from the given ones via DR.
As a consequence, the standard model can serve as a universal counterexample
against the claim that any non-DR-derivable clause holds in every binary power
context family respecting the given clauses.
Note that the usual proof techniques for completeness from modal logic (see
e.g. [Bla01] or [Po94]) using maximal consistent formula sets (also known as
ultrafilters) is not applicable here, since they require that the considered logic is
closed with respect to negation. This is not the case for FLE .
For the same reason, adapting other calculi (like that for the multi-modal logic
K(m) – see [Fi83]) and corresponding proofs to cumulated clauses on FLE cannot
be easily realized.
Definition 3.7 The standard model
−→
K (K) of a given set K of cumulated
clauses on FLEnorm is the binary power context family
−→
K = (KC , KR) = ((∆, MC , IC), (∆ × ∆, MR, IR))
defined as follows:
• First, we set
−→
K (0)(K) = ((∆(0), MC, I
(0)
C ), (∆
(0) × ∆(0), MR, I
(0)
R )) with
◆ ∆(0) := {N ⊆ FLEnorm | N respects all k ∈ K,⊥ 6∈ N},
◆ δI
(0)
C C :⇔ C ∈ δ,
◆ (δ1, δ2)I
(0)
R R :⇔
E
R.
d
C ∈ δ1 for all finite C ⊆ δ2 and
C ∈ δ2 for all
A
R.C ∈ δ1.
• From
−→
K (n)(K), we determine
−→
K (n+1)(K) by
◆ ∆(n+1) :=
{
δ ∈ ∆(n) | {C |
A
R.C ∈ δ} =
⋂
(δ,eδ)I(n)
R
R
δ̃ and
{C |
E
R.
d
C ∈ δ} =
⋃
(δ,eδ)I(n)
R
R
Pfin(δ̃)
for all R ∈ MR
}
,
◆ I
(n+1)
C := I
(0)
C ∩ (∆
(n+1) × MC),
◆ I
(n+1)
R := I
(0)
R ∩
(
(∆(n+1) × ∆(n+1)) × MR
)
.
• Finally, we set
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◆ ∆ :=
⋂
i∈N ∆
(i),
◆ IC := I
(0)
C ∩ (∆ × MC),
◆ IR := I
(0)
R ∩ (∆
2 × MR).
❑
Verbally: our standard model is approximated in a (possibly infinite) process,
starting by taking as entities all those sets of FLEnorm concept descriptions that
respect the given cumulated clauses K and that do not contain ⊥. The aim of the
construction is to achieve that every entity fulfills exactly those FLEnorm concept
descriptions from FLEnorm (semantically) that it contains (syntactically). To
reach that goal, we successively delete those entities not “compatible” with their
“role neighbors”.3 The final standard model can then be seen as the fixed point
of this process. In the sequel, we will show that this construction indeed fulfills
the intended purpose.
Lemma 3.8 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses on FLEnorm and
−→
K(K) the
corresponding standard model. Then we have for every D ∈ FLEnorm and every
δ ∈ ∆
D ∈ δ ⇐⇒ δ |= D.
Proof:
Obviously, for every δ ∈ ∆ from
−→
K(K) holds:
{C |
E
R.
l
C ∈ δ} =
⋃
{Pfin(δ̃) | (δ, δ̃)IRR} (∗)
as well as
{C |
A
R.C ∈ δ} =
⋂
{δ̃ | (δ, δ̃)IRR}. (∗∗)
We do now an induction over the maximal role depth of a concept description D:
• Induction anchor: D ∈ FLEnorm0 .
Then we have either D ∈ MC or D = ⊥. In the first case, we have D ∈ δ iff δICD by definition
of the standard model. By the semantics definition, this is equivalent to δ |= D.
Considering the second case, we find that ⊥ ∈ δ does not occur (due to the explicit exclusion
of entities containing ⊥ in the standard model definition). Likewise, δ |= ⊥ is never the case
since [[⊥]]−→
K
= ∅. So, those both statements are trivially equivalent.
3 This approach is related to Pratt’s type elimination technique (see [Pra79]), originally
used to decide satisfiability of modal formulae. However, contrary to his method, our standard
model construction process will in general not terminate after finitely many steps.
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• Induction step: D ∈ FLEnormn , n > 0.
Again, we have to distinguish two cases.
First, assume D =
E
R.
d
D with D ⊆ FLEnormn−1 . Then the statement
E
R.
d
D ∈ δ is obviously
equivalent to
D ∈ {C |
E
R.
l
C ∈ δ}
and this because of (*) to
D ∈
⋃
{Pfin(δ̃) | (δ, δ̃)IRR}.
So, we know that there exists an R-neighbor δ̃ of δ, which contains all concept descriptions
from D. Since D ⊆ FLEnormn−1 , we see by induction hypothesis that this is the case if and
only if δ̃ |= E for all E ∈ D. Subsequently, this is equivalent to
∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
E∈D
[[E]]−→
K
and this (by the semantics definition) to
∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈ [[
l
D]]−→
K
and finally to
δ ∈ [[
E
R.
l
D]]−→
K
which means just δ |=
E
R.
d
D.
It remains to consider the case D =
A
R.E with E ∈ FLEnormn−1 . Then
A
R.E ∈ δ can be written
as
E ∈ {C |
A
R.C ∈ δ}
which is due to (**) equivalent to
E ∈
⋂
{δ̃ | (δ, δ̃)IRR}.
Therefore knowing that all R-neighbors of δ contain E (which is an element of FLEnormn−1 ), we
conclude by the induction hypothesis that this is equivalent to
∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈ [[E]]−→
K
and by the semantics definition to
δ ∈ [[
A
R.E]]−→
K
which means just δ |=
A
R.E.
Note that all argumentations work in both directions. So indeed, the equivalence is assured.
❑
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In the sequel, we will define the notion of a homomorphism from one binary po-
wer context family to another, being a mapping on the corresponding universes
that preserves the (entity-wise) validity of all concept descriptions.
Definition 3.9 Given two binary power context families
−→
K1 (with universe ∆1)
and
−→
K2 (with universe ∆2) having identical sets of role and concept names, we
call a function f : ∆1 → ∆2 homomorphism from
−→
K1 to
−→
K 2, if
1. for all δ ∈ ∆1 and C ∈ FLE we have δ |= C ⇐⇒ f(δ) |= C and
2. for all δ, δ̃ ∈ ∆1 and R ∈ MR we have (δ, δ̃)IR1R implies (f(δ), f(δ̃))IR2R.
❑
Essentially, the next theorem shows that the standard model of a set K of cumu-
lated clauses is the most universal one: every model4 respecting K is contained
in the standard model in a certain way. This “certain way” is formally captured
in terms of the above defined notion of homomorphism.
Theorem 3.10 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses and
−→
K (K) = ((∆, IC, MC), (∆
2, IR, MR))
the corresponding standard model with universe ∆. Let furthermore
−→
K = ((∆̃, ĨC, MC), (∆̃
2, ĨR, MR))
be a binary power context family that respects all cumulated clauses from K. Then
the function ϕ : ∆̃ → P(FLEnorm) with ϕ(δ) = {C ∈ FLEnorm | δ |= C} is a
homomorphism from
−→
K to
−→
K(K).
Proof:
There are three facts to be shown:
(I) ϕ(δ) ∈ ∆ for all δ ∈ ∆̃,
(II) for all δ ∈ ∆̃ and C ∈ FLE we have δ |= C ⇐⇒ ϕ(δ) |= C, and
(III) for all δ, δ̄ ∈ ∆̃ and R ∈ MR we have (δ, δ̄)ĨRR implies (ϕ(δ), ϕ(δ̄))IRR.
The proof of Fact I will be done by inductively showing that ϕ(δ) is contained in all ∆(i) occurring
in the construction of
−→
K(K) (and therefore also in ∆ =
⋂
i∈N ∆
(i)).
4We use the term model synonymously for binary power context family.
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• induction anchor: ϕ(δ) ∈ ∆(0).
Since
−→
K respects K by assumption and [[⊥]]−→
K
= ∅, we have that ϕ(δ) = {C ∈ FLEnorm |
δ |= C} ∈ ∆(0).
Furthermore, notice that (δ1, δ2)ĨRR implies δ1 |=
E
R.
d
C for all finite C with δ2 |= C. It
also implies δ2 |= C for all C with δ1 |=
A
R.C. Due to the definition of ϕ, we then have
(ϕ(δ1), ϕ(δ2))I
(0)
R R. From this, we can conclude (ϕ(δ1), ϕ(δ2))I
(i)
R R for any i as long as
ϕ(δ1), ϕ(δ2) ∈ ∆(i) (*).
• induction step: ϕ(δ) ∈ ∆(i+1).
Let |≈ be the restriction of |= to FLEnorm, i.e., δ |≈ C :⇔ δ |= C and δ ∈ FLEnorm.
By induction hypothesis, we know that ϕ(δ̃) ∈ ∆(i) for all δ̃ ∈ ∆̃.
Note that then from (*), it follows that
(δ, δ̃)ĨRR ⇒ (ϕ(δ), ϕ(δ̃))I
(i)
R R
which in turn implies
{ϕ(δ̃) | (δ, δ̃)ĨRR} ⊆ {δ̄ | (ϕ(δ), δ̄)I
(i)
R R}
and therefore also
{Pfin(ϕ(δ̃)) | (δ, δ̃)ĨRR} ⊆ {Pfin(δ̄) | (ϕ(δ), δ̄)I
(i)
R R}.
Now, we will show that both conditions for ϕ(δ) being in ∆(i+1) are satisfied. First, we know
⋂
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(i)
R
R
δ̄
⊆
⋂
(δ,eδ)eIRR ϕ(δ̃)
=
⋂
(δ,eδ)eIRR{C | δ̃ |≈ C}
= {C | ∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)ĨRR → δ̃ |≈ C}
= {C | δ |≈
A
R.C}
= {C |
A
R.C ∈ ϕ(δ)}.
Conversely, by construction of I
(i)
R , from
A
R.C ∈ ϕ(δ) it follows that (ϕ(δ), δ̄)I
(0)
R R ⇒ C ∈ δ̄.
Because of I
(i)
R ⊆ I
(0)
R , this implies (ϕ(δ), δ̄)I
(i)
R R ⇒ C ∈ δ̄, from which we can immediately
conclude C ∈
⋂
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(i)
R
R
δ̄. Therefore, we have
{C |
A
R.C ∈ ϕ(δ)} ⊆
⋂
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(i)
R
R
δ̄.
Hence, the first condition is fulfilled.
Moreover, we have
⋃
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(i)
R
R
Pfin(δ̄)
⊇
⋃
(δ,eδ)eIRR Pfin(ϕ(δ̃))
=
⋃
(δ,eδ)eIRR{C | δ̃ |≈ C, C finite}
= {C | C finite, ∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)ĨRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K }
= {C | δ |≈
E
R.
d
C}
= {C |
E
R.
d
C ∈ ϕ(δ)}.
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Vice versa, assume C ∈
⋃
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(i)
R
R
Pfin(δ̄). By I
(i)
R ⊆ I
(0)
R , we can deduce that C ∈⋃
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(0)
R
R
Pfin(δ̄). This just means C ⊆ δ̄ for some δ̄ ∈ ∆ with (ϕ(δ), δ̄)I
(0)
R R. By
definition of I
(0)
R , we know that then
E
R.
d
C must be in ϕ(δ). So, this gives us
⋃
(ϕ(δ),δ̄)I
(i)
R
R
Pfin(δ̄) ⊆ {C |
E
R.
l
C ∈ ϕ(δ)}.
Thus, also the second condition is fulfilled.
By the two equalities shown above, we can conclude that ϕ(δ) ∈ ∆(i+1).
Fact II can be shown in the following way: Let δ ∈ ∆̃ and C ∈ FLE . Then we know that δ |= C if
and only if δ |=
d
n(C) due to Theorem 2.8. Obviously, this is the case exactly if δ |= n(C) which
(since n(C) ⊆ FLEnorm and by the definition of ϕ) coincides with n(C) ⊆ ϕ(δ). Lemma 3.8 and
Fact I of this theorem yield the equivalence to ϕ(δ) |= n(C) in the standard model. This means
ϕ(δ) |=
d
n(C) and is equivalent to ϕ(δ) |= C. Since the argumentation works in both directions,
the equivalence has been shown.
Fact III is an immediate consequence of (*) as stated above, since we now know that ϕ(δ) ∈ ∆ for
all δ ∈ ∆̃. ❑
A nice consequence of the preceding theorem is the fact that in order to decide
whether a set of cumulated clauses entails another cumulated clause, one just has
to take a look on the according standard model. This is formally specified in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.11 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses on FLEnorm and let k be a
cumulated clause. Then
K |= k ⇐⇒
−→
K(K) |= k.
Proof:
“=⇒”:
K |= k by definition means that every binary power context family respecting all cumulated clauses
also respects k. So, this in particular holds for
−→
K(K).
“⇐=”:
Assume the contrary, i.e., there were a binary power context family
−→
K with
−→
K |= K but
−→
K 6|= k.
However, this would imply that there is a δ in the universe of
−→
K such that {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→
K
} does
not respect k. Using the preceding Theorem 3.10, we get that for the standard model entity ϕ(δ)
the concept description set {C | ϕ(δ) ∈ [[C]]−→
K (K)
} does not respect k either and therefore conclude
−→
K(K) 6|= k. This contradicts our assumption. ❑
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3.1.4 Realization Trees
Now, we will show that every cumulated clause k valid in the standard model can
be derived from K by using DR. This will be done in several steps:
First, we define a tree structure that – starting from a given set A ⊆ FLEnorm –
represents all “branching possibilities” of extending A in order to make it respect
all cumulated clauses derivable from K. The basic idea of this construction thus
resembles that of early tableau methods, originally used for deciding satisfiability
in propositional logic (see [Be59] and [Sm68]) and also applied to modal logics
(see [Kri63]). However, while finiteness of the tableau is essential for decidability
problems, in our case the structure will be infinite in general.
Definition 3.12 Given a set K of cumulated clauses and a set A ⊆ FLEnorm,
we call a structure TKA = (N, r,≺, ǫ) realization tree of A if
• N is an arbitrary set (the elements of N will be called nodes),
r ∈ N (r will also be called the root),
≺⊆ N × N (≺ will be called the successor relation), and
ǫ is a function N → P(FLEnorm),
• (N,≺) is a tree with root r,
• ǫ(r) = A,
• a node ν ∈ N has successors (i.e., ν≺ := {ν̃ | ν ≺ ν̃} is nonempty), if
and only if ǫ(ν) does not respect all cumulated clauses from DR(K). In this
case, there is a cumulated clause k = B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} ∈ DR(K) (called
witnessing clause of ν) with
◆ B ⊆ ǫ(ν) and Ci 6⊆ ǫ(ν) for some i ∈ {1 . . . , n} (i.e., ǫ(ν) does not
respect k),
◆ k is minimal with respect to the greatest role depth in C1, . . . , Cn, and
◆ among those cumulated clauses fulfilling the two conditions above, k’s
conclusion is minimal with respect to set inclusion,
such that ν≺ = {ν1, . . . , νn} with ǫ(νi) = ǫ(ν) ∪ Ci.
Given such a realization tree, we call
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• (νi)i∈{0,...,k} a finite path if νi ≺ νi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < k and νk has no
successors,
• (νi)i∈N an infinite path if νi ≺ νi+1 for all i ∈ N,
• a (finite ore infinite) path (νi) complete if ν0 = r,
• A ⊆ FLEnorm a leaf if A = ǫ(ν) for a ν ∈ Ñ that has no successors,
• A ⊆ FLEnorm a pseudoleaf if we have A =
⋃
i∈N ǫ(νi) for some infinite
complete path (ni)i∈N, and
• A ⊆ FLEnorm a quasileaf if it is a leaf or pseudoleaf.
❑
Next, we define the term covering of a realization tree, being a transversal of all
complete paths in this tree.
Definition 3.13 Given a realization tree T = (N, r,≺, ǫ), a node set Ñ ⊆ N
will be called covering of T if every (finite or infinite) complete path r = ν0 ≺
ν1 ≺ . . . contains (at least) one element from Ñ . ❑
Using the fact that a realization tree is finitely branching, we can show that every
arbitrary covering contains a finite one.
Lemma 3.14 For every covering Ñ of a realization tree, there exists a finite
covering Nfin ⊆ Ñ .
Proof:
We let Nfin contain the minimal nodes from Ñ , i.e., all nodes ν fulfilling the condition that for the
path r = ν0 ≺ ν1 ≺ . . . ≺ νk ≺ ν (the uniqueness of which is assured by the tree structure), we
have ν0, ν1, . . . , νk 6∈ Ñ . We have to prove two propositions:
1. Nfin is a covering and
2. Nfin is finite.
1. Consider an arbitrary path r = ν0 ≺ ν1 ≺ . . . and suppose no node on it is in Nfin . But,
due to the assumption, it contains at least one node from Ñ . Now, the minimal one (in the
sense described above) of the nodes from Ñ lying on the path has to be in Nfin . This gives
a contradiction.
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2. For a ν ∈ N , let Nfinν be the set of all nodes from N
fin lying on paths going through ν.
Now suppose Nfin is infinite. Then we construct an infinite complete path ν0 ≺ ν1 ≺ . . . as
follows:
We start with ν0 = r. Note that N
fin
ν0
is infinite (since it is equal to Nfin).
For each νi (where we can presuppose that N
fin
νi
is infinite - therefore, νi must have successors
and cannot be in Nfin itself due to the definition of the latter via minimality), we consider
all successors. Since there are only finitely many (due to the definition every realization tree
is finitely branching), there must be (at least) one of them (say: ν̃) for which Nfineν is infinite.
Then we set νi+1 := ν̃.
The path constructed in this way does not contain any element from Nfin . But, as we just
have proven in (1), Nfin is a covering. So, we have a contradiction.
❑
In the sequel, we will show that for any cumulated clause “readable” from a
realization tree endowed with a covering, we can construct a corresponding DR
proof tree.
Lemma 3.15 Let A ⊆ FLEnorm and let TKA be a realization tree of A. Let fur-
thermore Ñ ⊆ N be a covering of TKA.
Let now C1, . . . , Cn ⊆ FLE
norm be finite sets such that for every ν ∈ Ñ , there is
an i ∈ {1 . . . n} with Ci ⊆ ǫ(ν).
Then there is a finite B ⊆ A such that K ⊢ B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}.
Proof:
W.l.o.g., we can assume Ñ to be finite due to Lemma 3.14.
We will prove the proposition by showing that for any node ν ∈ N where there is no ν̃ ∈ Ñ on the
path from r to ν, there is a finite Bν ⊆ ǫ(ν) such that Bν ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} is DR-derivable. (For
ν = r then follows the claimed result.)
(Note that every path starting from such a ν must contain an element from Ñ , for otherwise we
could construct a path starting from r and containing no element from Ñ , which would contradict
the precondition.)
Consider all paths starting from such a ν. For every such path ν = ν0 ≺ ν1 ≺ . . ., we can determine
the smallest index i such that νi ∈ Ñ . Among those path-wise smallest indices (there can be only
finitely many due to the finiteness of Ñ), we select the greatest one, call it the type of ν, and
denote it by τ(ν).
We will prove the proposition by induction over the type of the considered nodes.
• Induction anchor: τ(ν) = 0.
Then we have ν ∈ Ñ and thus Ck ⊆ ǫ(ν) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Clearly, K ⊢ Ck ⊸ {Ck}
due to the identity rule. By (n − 1)fold application of conclusion extension, we can derive
K ⊢ Ck ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}. Thus, we have found an appropriate Bν , namely Bν := Ck.
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• Induction step: τ(ν) > 0.
Then we have ν 6∈ Ñ and all successors ν1, . . . , νk of ν are of type less than τ(ν). Thus for
every νi holds by induction hypothesis that there is a finite Bνi ⊆ ǫ(νi) with K ⊢ Bνi ⊸
{C1, . . . , Cn}.
Let now be D ⊸ {E1, . . . , Ek} the witnessing clause of ν (and therefore in particular derivable
from K). Then we know that D ⊆ ǫ(ν) and ǫ(νi) = ǫ(ν) ∪ Ei for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Now,
we can do the following for all νi:
We define B̃νi := Bνi ∩ ǫ(ν). Then the cumulated clause B̃νi ∪ Ei ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} is either
equal to Bνi ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} or can be derived from it by applying the cumulated premise
extension rule. Then we can derive (with setting B̃ :=
⋃
1≤j≤k B̃νj ):
B̃νi ∪ Ei ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}
B̃νi ∪ D ∪ Ei ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}
PE*
B̃ ∪ D ∪ Ei ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}
PE*
Using those clauses, we can do the following derivation (remember that the derivability of
D ⊸ {E1, ..., Ek} can be presumed, as it is a witnessing clause):
D ⊸ {E1, ..., Ek}
B̃ ∪ D ⊸ {E1, ..., Ek}
PE*
B̃ ∪ D ∪ E1 ⊸ {C1, ..., Cn}
B̃ ∪ D ⊸ {C1, ..., Cn, E2, ..., Ek}
...
B̃ ∪ D ⊸ {C1, ..., Cn, Ek}
SUB
SUB
SUB
B̃ ∪ D ∪ Ek ⊸ {C1, ..., Cn}
B̃ ∪ D ⊸ {C1, ..., Cn}
SUB
So, we have K ⊢ B̃ ∪D ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}. But by construction, B̃ ∪D is a subset of ǫ(ν) and
(as a union of finitely many finite sets) also finite. So, we can set Bν := B̃ ∪ D and we are
done.
❑
In the next lemma, we prove that any quasilieaf of a realization tree respects all
clauses from DR(K). The proof idea therein is to show that any such cumulated
clause – if not respected “by accident” – will sooner or later become a witnessing
clause in any path.
After this, we show that if A does not imply ⊥, none of the realization tree nodes
does contain it either.
Lemma 3.16 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses, A ⊆ FLEnorm and let TKA =
(N, r,≺, ǫ) be a corresponding realization tree. Then for every quasileaf Q of TKA,
we have that Q respects all clauses from DR(K).
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Proof:
Let Q be the quasileaf and k ∈ DR(K). We distinguish two cases:
• Q is a leaf with corresponding node ν. Suppose Q does not respect k. Then either k fulfills the
minimality conditions from the definition or there is a “smaller” k̃ ∈ DR(K) that does. Thus,
we have found a possible witnessing clause, which by definition forces ν to have successors.
This contradicts our assumption.
• Q is a pseudoleaf with corresponding path p := (νi)i∈N. Suppose Q does not respect k. Let
k be the maximal role depth occurring in k. Now, we set Q̃ = Q∩FLEnormk . We know that
Q̃ is finite, since FLEnormk is finite (see Remark 2.6). Thus, there must exist a node νi in
p, such that Q̃ ⊆ ǫ(νi). Since νi is contained in an infinite path, it must have successors.
But then, it has a witnessing clause k̃ = A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}. Let Bj be the set from the
conclusion for which ǫ(νi+1) = ǫ(νi) ∪ Bj.
The maximal role depth of Bj must be greater than k, since otherwise we had Bj ⊆ Q̃ ⊆ ǫ(νi)
and thus, k̃ would already be respected by ǫ(νi), hence, it could not be a witnessing clause.
Therefore, the maximal role depth of k̃’s whole conclusion is greater than k. But then, k̃ is
not minimal as demanded in the definition, since the maximal role depth of k’s conclusion
is less or equal k and thus definitely smaller. So, we have found a contradiction to the
assumption that there is a k ∈ DR(K) not respected by Q.
❑
Definition 3.17 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses. A set A ⊆ FLEnorm will
be called consistent with respect to K if there is no finite set A∗ ⊆ A such that
K ⊢ A∗ ⊸ {{⊥}}. ❑
Lemma 3.18 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses and A ⊆ FLEnorm be consistent
with respect to K. For any realization tree TKA = (N, r,≺, ǫ) of A holds that ǫ(ν)
is consistent for all ν ∈ N .
Proof:
Assume the contrary.
By assumption, we have consistency of ǫ(r). So, if inconsistent nodes ν of T KA exist, there must be
some among them, the predecessor ν̃ of which is still consistent. Assume ν to be such a minimal
inconsistent node. Now, let k = B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} be the witnessing clause of ν̃.
First, note that K ⊢ Ci ⊸ {{⊥}} can not be true for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since otherwise, we could derive
B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} C1 ⊸ {{⊥}}
B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn−1, {⊥}}
SUB*
...
B ⊸ {Cn, {⊥}} Cn ⊸ {{⊥}}
B ⊸ {{⊥}}
SUB*
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contradicting the assumption that ν is a minimal inconsistent node. So, there must at least be one
1 ≤ i ≤ n such that Ci ⊸ {{⊥}} is not valid. W.l.o.g., we assume i = 1.
Now, let Cn be the set with ǫ(ν) = ǫ(ν̃) ∪ Cn. So, due to our assumption, we have
K ⊢ B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}
as well as
K ⊢ D ∪ Cn ⊸ {{⊥}}
for a finite D ∈ ǫ(ν̃).
Then we can do the following derivation:
B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}
D ∪ B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn}
PE*
D ∪ Cn ⊸ {{⊥}}
D ∪ B ∪ Cn ⊸ {{⊥}}
PE*
D ∪ B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn−1, {⊥}}
SUB
{⊥} ⊸ {C1}
CONT*
D ∪ B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn−1}
SUB*
Yet, the maximal role depth of the conclusion of this new cumulated clause k̃ (the derivability of
which has just been shown) is less or equal to that of k and furthermore, k̃’s conclusion is contained
in that of k. Therefore, k cannot be the witnessing clause of ν̃ since the minimality conditions are
violated. So, we have a contradiction to the prior assumption. ❑
3.1.5 Completeness
Exploiting the two preceding propositions, we now show that any quasileaf of a
realization tree with consistent root is an entity of the corresponding standard
model. The basic idea of this proof is to show that any such quasileaf “survives”
all iterations done in the standard model construction.
Furthermore, we show that any standard model entity has a quasileaf as a subset
as well.
Lemma 3.19 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses and A ⊆ FLEnorm consistent,
let TKA = (N, r,≺, ǫ) be a corresponding realization tree and
−→
K(K) the correspon-
ding standard model. Then the following two statements hold:
1. for all quasileafs Q of TKA, we have Q ∈ ∆ and
2. for all δ ∈ ∆ containing A and being minimal with respect to set inclusion,
there is a quasileaf Q of TKA with Q = δ.
Proof:
(1):
We will prove inductively that Q ∈ ∆(n) for all n ∈ N.
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Induction anchor: n = 0.
Obviously, Q ∈ ∆(0), since Q respects DR(K) (due to Lemma 3.16) and thus in particular K.
Additionally, we know that Q is consistent (and therefore in particular ⊥ 6∈ Q) due to Lemma 3.18.
Induction step: n > 0.
Considering Q, we have to show that
{C |
E
R.C ∈ Q} =
⋃
{Pfin(δ̃) | (Q, δ̃)I
(n−1)
R R} (*)
and
{C |
A
R.C ∈ Q} =
⋂
{δ̃ | (Q, δ̃)I
(n−1)
R R} (**)
(*):
”⊇” Let C be a finite subset of an R-neighbor δ̃ of Q in
−→
K (n−1). Since by construction we have
I
(n−1)
R ⊆ I
(0)
R , we also know that (Q, δ̃)I
(0)
R R. But in view of the definition of I
(0)
R , we know
that
E
R.
d
C has to be in Q.
”⊆” By induction hypothesis, we can assume that Q ∈ ∆(n−1). Let
E
R.
d
C ∈ Q. We now have
to show that (in
−→
K (n−1)) there is an R-neighbor of Q containing C. Suppose there is no
such successor. (+)
We set C̃ := C ∪{D |
A
R.D ∈ Q}. C̃ is consistent because otherwise, Q would be inconsistent
as the derivation
C̃ ⊸ {{⊥}}
[
E
R]C̃ ⊸ {{⊥}}
EL
[
E
R]C ∪ [
A
R]{D |
A
R.D ∈ Q} ⊸ {[
E
R]C̃}
AP*
[
E
R]C ∪ [
A
R]{D |
A
R.D ∈ Q} ⊸ {{⊥}}
SUB*
immediately shows.
Now consider a realization tree T KeC of C̃ (whose quasileafs are all in ∆(n−1) by induction
hypothesis). Due to the assumption (+), no quasileaf of T KeC is an R-neighbor of Q in −→K (n−1)
(since each of them contains C). But then (due to the definition of I
(n−1)
R ) no quasileaf of
T KeC is an R-neighbor of Q in −→K (0). So each of these T KeC -quasileafs must contradict one of
the conditions for being an R-neighbor of Q in
−→
K (0). Obviously, every quasileaf Q̃ of T KeC
fulfills the condition that C ∈ Q̃ for all
A
R.C ∈ Q, since already C̃ contains all such C. So, to
fulfill our assumption (+), every T KeC -quasileaf Q̃ must violate the other condition: it has to
contain a finite set D eQ ∈ FLEnorm such that ER. dD eQ 6∈ Q. (++)
For every T KeC -quasileaf Q̃, we find a node νp on each of its generating paths p with D eQ ⊆
ǫ(νp). Taking for all quasileafs Q̃ these nodes νp, we have found a covering N
∗ of T KeC . Due
to Lemma 3.14, we then also find a finite covering Ñ ⊆ N∗. For every ν̃ ∈ Ñ , we choose an
arbitrary path p̃ containing ν̃. Let p̃ generate Q̃. Now, we again assign a finite FLE subset
Deν to each ν̃ by Deν := D eQ.
Now, let
{D1, . . . ,Dk} := {Deν | ν̃ ∈ Ñ}.
Using Lemma 3.15, it follows
K ⊢ C∗ ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
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for a finite C∗ ⊆ C̃.
Now, we can carry out the following derivation:
[
E
R]C ∪ [
A
R](C∗ \ C) ⊸ {[
E
R]C∗}
AP*
C∗ ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
[
E
R]C∗ ⊸ {[
E
R]D1, . . . , [
E
R]Dk}
EL
[
E
R]C ∪ [
A
R](C∗ \ C) ⊸ {[
E
R]D1, . . . , [
E
R]Dk}
SUB*
Due to the construction of C and C∗, Q contains the premise of this cumulated clause.
Furthermore, we know from Lemma 3.16 that Q has to respect all clauses from DR(K). So,
Q has to contain one element from {[
E
R]D1, . . . , [
E
R]Dk} which contradicts the way they
have been chosen in (++).
So, our prior assumption (+) must be false.
(**):
”⊆” Let C be a concept description for which
A
R.C ∈ Q. By definition of I
(0)
R , we know that
this implies C ∈ δ̃ if (Q, δ̃)I
(0)
R R. So, we also know that C ∈
⋂
{δ̃ | (Q, δ̃)I
(0)
R R}. From
I
(n−1)
R ⊆ I
(0)
R , we can conclude that
⋂
{δ̃ | (Q, δ̃)I
(0)
R R} ⊆
⋂
{δ̃ | (Q, δ̃)I
(n−1)
R R} and
therefore C ∈
⋂
{δ̃ | (Q, δ̃)I
(n−1)
R R}.
”⊇” Let C ∈
⋂
{δ̃ | (Q, δ̃)I
(n−1)
R R}. We have to show that
A
R.C ∈ Q.
Assume the contrary, i.e.,
A
R.C 6∈ Q. Let C := {D |
A
R.D ∈ Q}. If C were inconsistent, we
could immediately construct a contradiction by deriving
C ⊸ {{⊥}}
[
A
R]C ⊸ {{
A
R.⊥}}
AL
{⊥} ⊸ {{C}}
CONT
{
A
R.⊥} ⊸ {{
A
R.C}}
AL
[
A
R]C ∪ {
A
R.⊥} ⊸ {{
A
R.C}}
PE*
[
A
R]C ⊸ {{
A
R.C}}
SUB
which would force Q to contain
A
R.C. So, C has to be consistent.
Now, consider a realization tree T KC of C (remember that by induction hypothesis, all its
quasileafs are in ∆(n−1)). We assign to each T KC -quasileaf Q̃ a finite concept description set
D eQ ⊆ Q̃ in the following way:
◆ For each quasileaf Q̃ with (Q, Q̃)I
(n−1)
R R, we set D eQ := {C} (this is correct, since C
is contained in every R-neighbor of Q in
−→
K (n−1)).
◆ If a quasileaf Q̃ is not an R-neighbor of Q in
−→
K (n−1), it cannot be an R-neighbor of Q in
−→
K (0) as well. Hence, it must violate one of the two conditions in the definition of I
(0)
R .
Obviously, every quasileaf Q̃ of T KC fulfills the condition that C ∈ Q̃ for all
A
R.C ∈ Q,
since already C contains all such C. So, the second condition must be violated and
thus there has to be a finite concept description set E ⊆ Q̃ with
E
R.
d
E 6∈ Q. Then
we set D eQ := E .
Now, since all those assigned concept description sets are finite, we find on every generating
path p of a quasileaf Q̃ a node νp for which already holds D eQ ⊆ ǫ(νp). Collecting all those
nodes, we get a covering N∗ of T KC . Due to Lemma 3.14, we find a finite covering Ñ ⊆ N
∗.
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For every ν̃ ∈ Ñ , we choose an arbitrary path p̃ containing ν̃. Let p̃ generate Q̃. Now, we
again assign a finite FLE subset Deν to each ν̃ by Deν := D eQ Now, let
{D1, . . . ,Dk} := {Deν | ν̃ ∈ Ñ}.
By using Lemma 3.15, it follows
K ⊢ C∗ ⊸ {D1, . . . ,Dk}
for a finite C∗ ⊆ C. If {C} is not yet contained in {D1, . . . ,Dk}, we may easily include it by
one application of the conclusion extension rule. So, we get
K ⊢ C∗ ⊸ {{C}, E1, . . . , Ej}
with
E
R.
d
Ei 6∈ Q (as the Ei have been chosen).
But now, a single application of the
A
-lifting rule yields
K ⊢ [
A
R]C∗ ⊸ {{
A
R.C}, [
E
R]E1, . . . , [
E
R]Ej}.
Since Q as a quasileaf of T KA has to respect all cumulated clauses of DR(K) (due to Lemma
3.16) and we have [
A
R]C∗ ⊆ Q by construction, Q has to contain either
A
R.C (which
contradicts our first assumption) or one [
E
R]Ei which contradicts the choice of the Ei. So
our assumption
A
R.C 6∈ Q must be false.
(2)
Since we know that ǫ(r) = A, we also know ǫ(r) ⊆ δ.
Now, we construct a complete path r = ν0 ≺ ν1 ≺ . . . in T KA in the following way: If νi has no
successors, we are done and have constructed a complete finite path. Otherwise, we select the node
νi+1 as follows: We presuppose that for a νi we have ǫ(νi) ⊆ δ. Considering the witnessing clause
k = B ⊸ {C1, . . . , Cn} of νi in T KA , we know that δ must respect k due to the soundness of DR.
Furthermore, Lemma 3.8 assures the correspondence of (syntactic) containment and (semantic)
validity of FLEnorm concept descriptions in the standard model. Hence, since the premise of the
witnessing clause is contained in ǫ(νi) which in turn is a subset of δ, we have δ |= B and therefore
we have δ |= Ck for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Now, we choose νi+1 such that ǫ(νi+1) = ǫ(νi) ∪ Ck,
thereby assuring ǫ(νi+1) ⊆ δ.
Let Q be the quasileaf generated by the (finite or infinite) complete path ν0 ≺ ν1 ≺ . . .. Due to
the first part of this theorem, we know that Q ∈ ∆. By construction, we also know that A ⊆ Q
as well as Q ⊆ δ. However, since δ is minimal with respect to set inclusion by assumption, we can
conclude Q = δ. ❑
Having established this correspondence between the standard model and real-
ization trees, it is not difficult to prove that any cumulated clause valid in the
standard model is DR-derivable, which (as the subsequent corollary shows) gives
us the completeness of DR.
Theorem 3.20 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses and let k be a cumulated
clause. Then,
−→
K (K) |= k =⇒ K ⊢ k.
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Proof:
Let k = A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}. Consider a realization tree T KA of A. From Theorem 3.19, we know
that for each quasileaf Q of T KA holds Q ∈ ∆. From A ⊆ Q and using Lemma 3.16, we can conclude
Bi ⊆ Q for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since all Bi are finite, we find on every complete path a node ν for which already holds Bi ⊆ ǫ(ν)
for some Bi. This means that we have found a covering N∗ of T KA , that due to Lemma 3.14 can be
minimized to a finite covering Ñ ⊆ N∗. In view of Lemma 3.15 we then get K ⊢ A∗ ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}
for some A∗ ⊆ A and consequently by cumulated premise extension K ⊢ A ⊸ {B1, . . . ,Bn}. ❑
Corollary 3.21 The deduction calculus DR for cumulated clauses on FLEnorm
is sound and complete.
Proof:
Soundness has been shown by Theorem 3.4. Completeness also follows directly from the preceding
theorem: If a cumulated clause k is valid in all power context families that respect a set K of
cumulated clauses, it is in particular valid in
−→
K(K). But then it is derivable. ❑
3.2 A Decision Procedure
In this section, we describe a way to decide whether a cumulated clause on
FLEnorm is a semantic consequence of a finite set of cumulated clauses. This
will be done by the construction of a “finite version” of the standard model
where the maximal role depth of the involved concept descriptions is restricted.
Hence, this model can be computed in finitely many steps.
Definition 3.22 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses on FLEnormk with k ∈ N.
The k-limited standard model
−→
K k(K) is the binary power context family
−→
K k(K) = (KC, KR) = ((∆, MC , IC), (∆ × ∆, MR, IR)) defined as follows:
• First, we set
−→
K (0)(K) = ((∆(0), MC, I
(0)
C ), (∆
(0) × ∆(0), MR, I
(0)
R )) with
◆ ∆(0) := {N ⊆ FLEnormk | N respects all k ∈ K,⊥ 6∈ N},
◆ δI
(0)
C C :⇔ C ∈ δ,
◆ (δ1, δ2)I
(0)
R R :⇔
E
R.
d
C ∈ δ1 for all C ⊆ δ2 ∩ FLE
norm
k−1 and
C ∈ δ2 for all
A
R.C ∈ δ1.
• From
−→
K
(n)
k (K), we determine
−→
K
(n+1)
k (K) by
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◆ ∆(n+1) :=
{
δ ∈ ∆(n) | {C |
A
R.C ∈ δ} = FLEnormk−1 ∩
⋂
(δ,eδ)I(n)
R
R
δ̃ and
{C |
E
R.
d
C ∈ δ} =
⋃
(δ,eδ)I(n)
R
R
P(δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 )
for all R ∈ MR
}
,
◆ I
(n+1)
C := I
(0)
C ∩ ∆
(n+1) × MC,
◆ I
(n+1)
R := I
(0)
R ∩ (∆
(n+1) × ∆(n+1)) × MR.
• Now, we set
◆ ∆ :=
⋂
i∈N ∆
(i),
◆ IC := I
(0)
C ∩ ∆ × MC, and
◆ IR := I
(0)
R ∩ ∆
2 × MR.
❑
Note that due to the finiteness of ∆(0), the fact ∆(0) ⊇ ∆(1) ⊇ ∆(2) ⊇ . . ., and
knowing that from ∆(i) = ∆(i+1) directly follows ∆(i) = ∆(j) for any j ≥ i, we
know that
• ∆ = ∆(i) for some i as well as
• computing the sequence ∆(0), ∆(1), ∆(2), . . ., it can be decided when this i
has been reached.
This ensures that
−→
Kk(K) is computable.
Lemma 3.23 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses on FLEnormk and
−→
K k(K) the
corresponding k-limited standard model. Then, we have for every D ∈ FLEnormk
and every δ ∈ ∆
D ∈ δ ⇐⇒ δ |= D.
Proof:
Obviously, for every δ ∈ ∆ from
−→
K(K) holds:
{C |
E
R.
l
C ∈ δ} =
⋃
{P(δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 ) | (δ, δ̃)IRR} (*)
as well as
{C |
A
R.C ∈ δ} = FLEnormk−1 ∩
⋂
{δ̃ | (δ, δ̃)IRR}. (**)
We do now an induction over the maximal role depth of a concept description D:
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• Induction anchor: D ∈ FLEnorm0 .
Then we have either D ∈ MC or D = ⊥. In the first case, we have D ∈ δ if and only if δICD
by definition of the standard model. In view of the semantics definition, this is equivalent to
δ |= D.
Considering the second case, we find that ⊥ ∈ δ does not occur (due to the explicit exclusion
of entities containing ⊥ in the standard model definition) as well as δ |= ⊥ is never the case
since [[⊥]]−→
K
= ∅. So, those both statements are trivially equivalent.
• Induction step: D ∈ FLEnormn , 0 < n ≤ k.
Again, we have to distinguish two cases.
First, assume D =
E
R.
d
D with D ⊆ FLEnormn−1 . Then, the statement
E
R.
d
D ∈ δ is
obviously equivalent to
D ∈ {C |
E
R.
l
C ∈ δ}
and this - because of (*) - to
D ∈
⋃
{P(δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 ) | (δ, δ̃)IRR}.
So, we know that there exists an R-neighbor δ̃ of δ, which contains all concept descriptions
from D. Since D ⊆ FLEnormn−1 , we see by induction hypothesis that this is the case exactly if
δ̃ |= E for all E ∈ D. Subsequently, this is equivalent to
∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈
⋂
E∈D
[[E]]−→
K
and this (by the semantics definition) to
∃δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR ∧ δ̃ ∈ [[
l
D]]−→
K
and finally to
δ ∈ [[
E
R.
l
D]]−→
K
which means just δ |=
E
R.
d
D.
It remains to consider the case D =
A
R.E with E ∈ FLEnormn−1 . Then,
A
R.E ∈ δ can be written
as
E ∈ {C |
A
R.C ∈ δ}
which is due to (**) equivalent to
E ∈
⋂
{δ̃ | (δ, δ̃)IRR}.
Therefore knowing that all R-neighbors of δ contain E (which is an element of FLEnormn−1 ), we
conclude by the induction hypothesis that this is equivalent to
∀δ̃ : (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈ [[E]]−→
K
and by the semantics definition to
δ ∈ [[
A
R.E]]−→
K
which means just δ |=
A
R.E.
Note that all argumentations work in both directions. So indeed, the equivalence is assured.
❑
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In the sequel, we will show a correspondence between the k-limited standard
model and the standard model from section 3.1.
Theorem 3.24 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses on FLEnormk for some k ∈ N.
Let
−→
K (K) = ((∆, IC, MC), (∆
2, IR, MR))
and
−→
Kk(K) = ((∆̃, ĨC, MC), (∆̃
2, ĨR, MR)).
Then
∆̃ = {δ ∩ FLEk | δ ∈ ∆}.
Proof:
“⊆”
−→
Kk(K) respects all clauses from K due to the definition of ∆̃ (via ∆̃
(0)) and Lemma 3.23. Hence,
Theorem 3.10 is applicable. So, we get for all δ̃ ∈ ∆̃
ϕ(δ̃) ∈ ∆
and therefore also
ϕ(δ̃) ∩ FLEnormk ∈ {δ ∩ FLE
norm
k | δ ∈ ∆}.
On the other hand, from the definition of ϕ and Lemma 3.23, it follows
ϕ(δ̃) ∩ FLEnormk = {C ∈ FLE
norm
k | δ̃ |= C} = {C ∈ FLE
norm
k | C ∈ δ̃} = δ̃.
This yields
δ̃ ∈ {δ ∩ FLEnormk | δ ∈ ∆}.
“⊇”
First, we will show two helpful facts:
• For all δ ∈ ∆, we have δ ∩ FLEnormk ∈ ∆̃
(0).
By construction, we know that δ has to be in ∆(0). If so, it has to respect all cumulated
clauses from K and must not contain ⊥. Since K is taken from CC(FLEnormk ), we can
conclude that the same conditions hold for δ ∩ FLEnormk and hence δ ∩ FLE
norm
k ∈ ∆̃
(0).
• For all δ, δ̃ ∈ ∆ with (δ, δ̃)IRR, we have (δ ∩ FLE
norm
k , δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k )Ĩ
(0)
R R.
From (δ, δ̃)IRR, it follows that
E
R.
d
C ∈ δ for all finite C ⊆ δ̃ as well as C ∈ δ̃ for all
A
R.C ∈ δ by definition. This obviously directly implies
E
R.
d
C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk for all
C ⊆ δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 and C ∈ δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k for all
A
R.C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk . Since we also know
by the preceding fact that δ ∩ FLEnormk ∈ ∆̃
(0) and δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk ∈ ∆̃
(0), we can conclude
(δ ∩ FLEnormk , δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k )Ĩ
(0)
R R.
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Now, we consider the inclusion to show. Assume the contrary, i.e., for a certain δ ∈ ∆, there is
no counterpart in ∆̃ coinciding with δ on FLEnormk . However, certainly δ ∩ FLE
norm
k ∈ ∆̃
(0), since
δ respects all clauses from K and ⊥ 6∈ δ (these are necessary conditions for δ ∈ ∆ by definition).
Then, δ ∩ FLEnormk ∈ ∆̃
(h) and δ ∩ FLEnormk 6∈ ∆̃
(h+1) for some h ∈ N. We consider a δ with
minimal h.
So, we know that {δ̄ ∩FLEnormk | δ̄ ∈ ∆} ⊆ ∆̃
(h). By the second of the facts shown above and the
definition of Ĩ
(h)
R , we have also (δ ∩ FLE
norm
k , δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k )Ĩ
(h)
R R for all δ, δ̃ ∈ ∆ with (δ, δ̃)IRR.
Thus, we can conclude:
{C |
E
R
d
C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk }
= {C ∩ FLEnormk−1 |
E
R
d
C ∈ δ}
=
⋃
(δ,eδ)IRR Pfin(δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 )
⊆
⋃
(δ,eδ)eI(h)
R
R
Pfin(δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k−1 )
and by construction of Ĩ
(h)
R via Ĩ
(0)
R ,
⋃
(δ,eδ)eI(h)
R
R
Pfin(δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k−1 ) ⊆ {C |
E
R
l
C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk }
as well as
{C |
A
R.C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk }
=
⋂
(δ,eδ)IRR δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1
⊇
⋂
(δ,eδ)eI(h)
R
R
δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1
and by construction of Ĩ
(h)
R via Ĩ
(0)
R ,
{C |
A
R.C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk } ⊆
⋂
(δ,eδ)eI(h)
R
R
δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 .
But then, the facts
{C |
E
R
l
C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk } =
⋃
(δ,eδ)eI(h)
R
R
Pfin(δ̃ ∩ FLE
norm
k−1 )
and
{C |
A
R.C ∈ δ ∩ FLEnormk } =
⋂
(δ,eδ)eI(h)
R
R
δ̃ ∩ FLEnormk−1 .
imply by definition δ ∩ FLEnormk ∈ ∆̃
(h+1). This contradicts our assumption. ❑
Corollary 3.25 Let K be a set of cumulated clauses on FLEnorm and let k be a
cumulated clause on FLEnorm. Let k ∈ N be a number equal or greater than the
greatest role depth occurring in K ∪ {k}. Then
K |= k ⇐⇒
−→
K k(K) |= k.
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Proof:
Let ∆ be the universe of
−→
K(K), let ∆̃ be the universe of
−→
Kk(K), and let k = A ⊸ {B1, . . . , Bk}.
Due to Theorem 3.11, we know that K |= k if and only if
−→
K(K) |= k. By definition, this is equivalent
to the statement A ⊆ {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→
K (K)
} →
∨
1≤i≤n Bi ⊆ {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→K (K)} for every δ ∈ ∆. From
Theorem 3.8, it follows that A ⊆ δ →
∨
1≤i≤n Bi ⊆ δ for every δ ∈ ∆, and due to Theorem 3.24
and the choice of k, this statement is valid for all δ ∈ ∆̃ as well. Now, from Lemma 3.23 follows
the equivalence to A ⊆ {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→
K k(K)
} →
∨
1≤i≤n Bi ⊆ {C | δ ∈ [[C]]−→K k(K)} for every δ ∈ ∆̃
which by definition just means
−→
Kk(K) |= k. ❑
We are aware that a decision procedure based on the k-limited standard model will
be quite inefficient or even wholly infeasible in practice, at least if implemented
straightforward.
However, we consider this approach nevertheless interesting due to several (the-
oretical and practical) reasons:
• It seems to be “dual” (in an informal sense) to the well known tableau based
decision procedures. Both methods try to construct a model fulfilling all
desired properties. DL tableau algorithms start with what is absolutely
necessary and successively extend the model-to-be by individuals forced to
exist by the descriptions. They end up either with a clash (contradiction)
or a minimal model.
In contrast, the method presented in this section starts with virtually “ev-
erything” and prunes this structure by successively deleting “invalid” enti-
ties until nothing remains (in case of unsatisfiability) or a model is obtained.
The result is the maximal model in the sense elaborated in Theorem 3.10.
• In the scientific field of model checking, there have been achievements in
finding ways to economically specify large entity sets with attributes. One
promising approach are ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) (see
[Br92] for a survey) which have already proven useful in applications (as
comprehensively described in [HR00]) even closely related to modal logic.
If it were possible to encode the k-limited standard model (resp. the in-
termediate structures used to construct it) as OBDD and to find a way
to execute the described construction steps implicitly on this OBBD, the
proposed method could turn out to be not as infeasible for practical cases.
However, this is speculative and according evidence has still to be supplied.
• If the above mentioned problems could be overcome, one advantage of this
approach in comparison to the ad-hoc-construction done in tableau algo-
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rithms is that the model for a fixed set of general concept inclusion axioms
has to be constructed only once (and used for all queries – for a bounded
(and a-priori known) maximal role depth).
Chapter 4
Complete Attribute Exploration
on FLE
In this chapter, we provide the theoretical background for an exploration algo-
rithm on FLE concept descriptions (a similar procedure for EL has been presented
in [Ru03] and the extension to FLE sketched in [Ru04]). The intended purpose is
to accumulate all information about a binary power context family necessary to
decide whether any FLE subsumption statement of a certain maximal role depth
is valid therein. Moreover, this should be done as efficient as possible. In more
detail, we will proceed as follows:
Given a binary power context family and a set of concept descriptions, we define
an FLE-context that mirrors the validity of these concept descriptions for all
entities of the binary power context family. We show that implications in the
FLE-context coincide with
−→
K -subsumption statements in the binary power con-
text family
−→
K . This motivates that attribute exploration on particular FLE-
contexts will be used to achieve the goal depicted above.
We propose to proceed stepwise, i.e., we collect all information expressible by
concept descriptions with role depth of at most i ∈ N and increment i thereafter.
As we will show, this gives the opportunity to reduce the set of attributes of the
context to explore. Additionally, we show how exactly the collected information
(actually consisting only of implications on a rather restricted FLE subset) can
be used to decide an arbitrary FLE subsumption.
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4.1 FLE-Contexts
On the basis of a binary power context family, we can define for an arbitrary
set of FLE concept descriptions a corresponding formal context which states for
every entity from the underlying universe which of the concept descriptions are
valid in it.1
Definition 4.1 Given a binary power context family
−→
K = (KC, KR) on a uni-
verse ∆ and a set M ⊆ FLE(MC , MR), the corresponding FLE-context is
defined in the following way:
KFLE(M) := (∆, M, I) with δIm :⇔ δ ∈ [[m]]−→K .
❑
The next theorem shows that implications in FLE-contexts coincide with
−→
K -
subsumption statements on the described binary power context family
−→
K .
Theorem 4.2 Let
−→
K be an arbitrary binary power context family and KFLE(M)
a corresponding FLE-context. Then for C,D ⊆ M , the implication
C_D
holds in KFLE if and only if l
C ⊑−→
K
l
D.
Proof:
KFLE |= C_D
⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ : C ∈ δI → D ∈ δI
⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ :
∧
C∈C δIC →
∧
D∈D δID
⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ :
∧
C∈C δ ∈ [[C]]−→K →
∧
D∈D δ ∈ [[D]]−→K
⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ : δ ∈
⋂
C∈C [[C]]−→K → δ ∈
⋂
D∈D [[D]]−→K
⇒ ∀δ ∈ ∆ : δ ∈ [[
d
C]]−→
K
→ δ ∈ [[
d
D]]−→
K
⇒ [[
d
C]]−→
K
⊆ [[
d
D]]−→
K
⇒
d
C ⊑−→
K
d
D
❑
1Of course, this kind of contexts can be constructed not only by taking FLE concept de-
scriptions as attributes. In principle, concept descriptions of any description logic can be used
(as it is done for ALC in [Pre00]; also in [Ba95] and [BS04], similar constructions have been
used). However in this work, we focus on FLE and the subsequent results are specific to that
formalism. The possibility of extending the results to more expressive description logics will be
briefly discussed in Section 9.5.
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Remark 4.3 Due to Definition 3.1, we additionally have for any binary power
context family
−→
K with a corresponding FLE-context KFLE(M) and C,D ∈ M
KFLE(M) |= C_D ⇐⇒
−→
K |= C ⊸ {D}
as a trivial consequence. Thus, when discussing semantic entailment in an FLE-
context, we can use appropriate results from Chapter 3.
In the sequel, we will exploit this correspondence in the following way: em-
ploying the FCA exploration method allows us to collect all information about a
(not explicitly given) binary power context family expressible by
−→
K -subsumption
statements on FLE i for a certain role depth i.
In order to achieve this, one could simply explore the context KFLE(FLE i). Yet,
the complexity of the exploration algorithm is exponential with respect to the
number of attributes and a lot of the FLE i concept descriptions are (even univer-
sally) equivalent to the conjunctions of others and therefore dispensable. Thus,
it is essential to see how the set of attributes can be reduced without losing the
above mentioned property.
Theorem 2.8 shows that FLEnormi would be such an attribute set: to check C ⊑−→K
D with C, D ∈ FLE i one would just have to look whether n(C) _ n(D) is valid in
KFLE(FLE
norm
i ).
In the following, we will show that one can do still much better by proceeding
iteratively: Starting with role depth 0, explore an according context, and then
exploit the information gathered so far for defining a reduced set of attributes for
the next context with incremented role depth.
4.2 Empiric Attribute Reduction
Based on a binary power context family, we define a sequence of particular FLE-
contexts. The attribute set of a context in this sequence depends on the impli-
cational theory of the preceding context.
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Definition 4.4 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family. We define the sequence
(Ki) of formal contexts by
M0 := MC ∪ {⊥},
Ki := KFLE(Mi) = (∆, Mi, Ii),
Mi+1 := M0
∪{
A
R.C | R ∈ MR, C ∈ Mi}
∪{
E
R.
d
C | R ∈ MR, C concept intent of Ki,⊥ 6∈ C}
for i ≥ 0
❑
Now, we show a way how the validity of any
−→
K -subsumption statement on FLE i
can be checked by using just the attribute sets (Mi) as well as the corresponding
closure operators (.)IiIi on that sets (which could e.g. be represented by the
according stem bases). First, we will define functions that provide for any FLE i
concept description C a set of attributes C ⊆ Mi such that for any entity δ of the
underlying universe we have δ |= C iff δ |= C.
Definition 4.5 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family and the corresponding
sequences (Mi), (Ki) defined as above. Given the according sequence cl0, . . . , cln
of closure operators (i.e., cli(C) = CIiIi for C ⊆ Mi), we define two sequences of
functions τi : FLE i → P(FLE i) and τ̄i : FLE i → P(FLE i) recursively:
τ̄i(C) = cli(τi(C))
τi(C) = {C} for C ∈ M0
τi(
d
C) =
⋃
{τi(C) | C ∈ C}
τi(
A
R.C) = [
A
R]τ̄i−1(C) = {
A
R.C̃ | C̃ ∈ τ̄i−1(C)}
τi(
E
R.C) = [
E
R]τ̄i−1(C) =
{
{⊥} if ⊥ ∈ τ̄i−1(C),
{
E
R.
d
τ̄i−1(C)} otherwise.
❑
Note that by this definition, we also have τ̄i(⊤) = τ̄i(
d
∅) = cli(∅). Next, we have
to show that the functions just defined behave in the desired way. The following
lemma assures that τ̄i and τi indeed map to Mi.
Lemma 4.6 Suppose C ∈ FLE i. Then we have τi(C) ⊆ Mi and τ̄i(C) ⊆ Mi.
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Proof:
Obviously, τ̄i(C) ⊆ Mi whenever τi(C) ⊆ Mi. We show the latter by induction on the role depth
considering four cases:
• C ∈ MC ∪ {⊥}. Then by definition C ∈ Mi.
• C =
E
R.C̃. If ⊥ ∈ τ̄i−1(C̃), we get τi(
E
R.C̃) = [
E
R]τ̄i−1(C) = [
E
R]Mi−1 = {⊥} ⊆ Mi.
Now suppose ⊥ 6∈ τ̄i−1(C̃). As immediate consequence of the induction hypothesis we
have τ̄i−1(C̃) ⊆ Mi−1. Since τ̄i−1 gives a closed set with respect to cli−1, we have also
E
R.
d
τ̄i−1(C̃) ∈ Mi, as a look to the constructive definition of Mi immediately shows.
Therefore, τi(
E
R.C) = {
E
R.
d
τ̄i−1(C̃)} ⊆ Mi
• C =
A
R.C̃. Again, our induction hypothesis yields τ̄i−1(C̃) ⊆ Mi−1 which implies {
A
R.C̃ |
C̃ ∈ τ̄i−1(C)} ⊆ Mi due to the definition of Mi and therefore also τi(
A
R.C) = {
A
R.C̃ | C̃ ∈
τ̄i−1(C)} ⊆ Mi.
• C =
d
C̃. W.l.o.g., we presuppose that there is no conjunction outside the quantifier range
in any C̃ ∈ C̃. So we have τi(C̃) ⊆ Mi due to the three cases above, and subsequently also
τi(
d
C) =
(⋃
{τi(C̃) | C ∈ C}
)
⊆ Mi. ❑
The next lemma and theorem show that in our fixed interpretation
−→
K , for any
concept description C ∈ FLE i, the entity sets fulfilling C on the one hand and
τ̄i(C) as well as τi(C) on the other hand coincide.
Lemma 4.7 For any C ⊆ Mi, we have
d
C ≡−→
K
d
cli(C).
Proof:
[[
d
C]]−→
K
=
⋂
{[[C]]−→
K
| C ∈ C} =
⋂
{CIi | C ∈ C} = CIi = CIiIiIi = cli(C)Ii =
⋂
{CIi | C ∈ cli(C)} =⋂
{[[C]]−→
K
| C ∈ cli(C)} = [[
d
cli(C)]]−→
K
. ❑
Theorem 4.8 Let C ∈ FLE i. Then C ≡−→K
d
τi(C) ≡−→K
d
τ̄i(C).
Proof:
The second equivalence is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.7. We show the first one again via
induction on the role depth:
• C ∈ MC ∪ {⊥}. Then, we trivially have [[C]]−→
K
= [[
d
{C}]]−→
K
.
• C =
E
R.C̃. By induction hypothesis, we get [[C̃]]−→
K
= [[
d
τ̄i−1(C̃)]]−→
K
, therefore [[
E
R.C̃]]−→
K
=
[[
E
R.
d
τ̄i−1(C̃)]]−→
K
which by definition equals [[
d
τi(
E
R.C̃)]]−→
K
.
• C =
A
R.C̃. Again, by induction hypothesis, we get [[C̃]]−→
K
= [[
d
τ̄i−1(C̃)]]−→
K
=
⋂
{[[D]]−→
K
|
D ∈ τ̄i−1(C̃)}. Now, observe that the statement (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈ [[C̃]]−→
K
is equivalent to∧
D∈τ̄i−1(eC) ((δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈ [[D]]−→K ) and thus [[ AR.C̃]]−→K = {δ | (δ, δ̃)IRR → δ̃ ∈ ⋂{[[C̃]]−→K }} =
{δ |
∧
D∈τ̄i−1(eC) δ ∈ [[ AR.D]]−→K } = ⋂{[[ AR.D]]−→K | D ∈ τ̄i−1(C̃)} = [[ d{ AR.D | D ∈ τ̄i−1(C̃)}]]−→K
which by definition is just [[
d
τi(
A
R.C)]]−→
K
.
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• C =
d
C̃. Again, we can presume no conjunction outside the quantifier range in any C̃ ∈ C̃.
Then [[
d
C̃]]−→
K
=
⋂
{[[C̃]]−→
K
| C̃ ∈ C̃} =
⋂
{[[
d
τi(C̃)]]−→
K
| C̃ ∈ C̃} because of the cases shown
before. Now, this is obviously the same as
⋂
{[[D]]−→
K
| D ∈ τ̄i(C̃), C̃ ∈ C̃} = [[
d
(
⋃
{τ̄i(C̃) | C̃ ∈
C̃})]]−→
K
= τi(
d
C̃). ❑
Using these propositions, we can easily provide a method to check – using only
the closure operators cl0, . . . , cli – the validity of any
−→
K -subsumption statement
on FLE i with respect to a fixed (but not explicitly known) binary power context
family
−→
K . It suffices to apply τ̄i on both sides and then check for inclusion.
Corollary 4.9 Let C1, C2 ∈ FLE i. Then C1 ⊑−→K C2 if and only if τ̄i(C2) ⊆ τ̄i(C1).
Proof:
Due to Theorem 4.8, C1 ⊑−→
K
C2 is equivalent to
d
τ̄i(C1) ⊑−→
K
d
τ̄i(C2). According to Lemma 4.6, we
have τ̄i(C1) ⊆ Mi and τ̄i(C2) ⊆ Mi. In view of Theorem 4.2, this means the same as the validity
of the implication τ̄i(C1)_ τ̄i(C2) in Ki. Now, since the application of τ̄ always gives a closed set
with respect to Ki, this is equivalent to τ̄i(C2) ⊆ τ̄i(C1). ❑
Finally, consider the function τi from Definition 4.5. It is easy to see that for any
C ∈ Mi−1 by calculating τi(C) we get a singleton set {D} with D ∈ Mi. We then
have even C ≡−→
K
D. For the sake of readability we will just write D = (C)i. Roughly
spoken, D is just the “equivalent Mi-version” of C. Note that evaluating τi does
not need the closure operator cli but only cl0, . . . , cli−1.
4.3 Directly Derivable Implications
Aiming at a stepwise exploration process proceeding from role depth i to role
depth i + 1, we are now interested in which implications valid in Ki+1 can be
directly derived from those holding in Ki.
Lemma 4.10 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family, R ∈ MR, A1,A2,A,B ⊆
Mi, A = A1 ∪ A2, and let A_B be an implication that holds in Ki. Then the
following implications are valid in Ki+1:
1. {⊥}_Mi+1
2. {(A)i+1 | A ∈ A}_{(B)i+1 | B ∈ B}
3. [
E
R]cli(A)_ [
E
R]cli(B)
4. [
A
R]A_ [
A
R]B
5. [
A
R]A1 ∪ [
E
R]cli(A2)_ [
E
R]cli(B)
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Proof:
That all concept descriptions used in this description are in Mi is assured by their construction
(cf. Definition 4.4).
The soundness of (1) can be seen as an immediate consequence of the cumulated contradiction rule
in DR (see Lemma 3.5).
(2) is just the repetition of already known implications in terms of the new attribute set. Formally, it
can be justified as follows: Ki |= A_B implies
d
A ⊑−→
K
d
B due to Theorem 4.2. Furthermore, as
a consequence of Corollary 4.9 we have
d
A ≡−→
K
d
{(A)i+1 | A ∈ A} and
d
B ≡−→
K
d
{(B)i+1 | B ∈ B}.
This implies
d
{(A)i+1 | A ∈ A} ⊑−→
K
d
{(B)i+1 | B ∈ B} and (again by Theorem 4.2) consequently
Ki+1 |= {(A)i+1 | A ∈ A}_{(B)i+1 | B ∈ B}.
For showing (3), note that by Corollary 4.9, Ki |= A_B implies cli(B) = τ̄i(
d
B) ⊆ τ̄i(
d
A) =
cli(A). Therefore, we can derive
cli(B) ⊸ {cli(B)}
ID
cli(A) ⊸ {cli(B)}
PE
[
E
R]cli(A) ⊸ {[
E
R]cli(B)}
EL
and are done.
The validity of (4) is a one-step consequence of A_B by using the
A
-lifting deduction rule from
DR.
Now, consider (5). Let Ā2 := cli(A2) as well as B̄ := cli(B). Then we can deduce
[
A
.R]A1 ∪ [
E
.R]Ā2 ⊸ {[
E
.R](Ā2 ∪ A1)}
AP*
A2 ∪ A1 ⊸ {B̄}
Ā2 ∪ A1 ⊸ {B̄}
PE
[
E
.R](Ā2 ∪A1) ⊸ {[
E
.R]B̄}
EL
[
A
.R]A1 ∪ [
E
.R]Ā2 ⊸ {[
E
.R]B̄}
SUB
❑
Naturally, we are interested in a small set of implications generating all those
implications stated above by the Armstrong rules. Here, we provide such a small
representation and prove that every implication from Lemma 4.10 can be derived
from it.
Definition 4.11 Let Li be the stem base of Ki. Then we define the implication
set λ(Li) as follows
λ(Li) :={
{⊥}_Mi+1
}
∪
{
{(A)i+1 | A ∈ A}_{(B)i+1 | B ∈ B} | A_B ∈ Li
}
∪
{
{
A
R.A | A ∈ A}_{
A
R.B | B ∈ B} | A_B ∈ Li
}
∪
{
{
E
R.
d
ALi}_{
E
R.
d
BLi} | BLi ( ALi ⊆ Mi, 6 ∃CLi : ALi ( CLi ( BLi
}
∪
{
{
E
R.
d
A,
A
R.A}_{
E
R.
d
(A ∪ {A})Li} | A = ALi ⊆ Mi, A ∈ Mi\A
}
❑
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Lemma 4.12 Every implication from Lemma 4.10 can be derived from λ(Li)
using the Armstrong rules.
Proof:
1. The implication {⊥}_Mi+1 is contained in λ(Li).
2. If A_B is valid in Ki, it is also Armstrong-derivable from Li. If we take this derivation and
exchange every attribute C with (C)i, we obviously obtain a valid Armstrong-derivation of
{(A)i+1 | A ∈ A}_{(B)i+1 | B ∈ B} from λ(Li) because λ(Li) contains the “i + 1-version”
of Li.
3. From Ki |= A _ B follows BLi ⊆ ALi . If BLi = ALi , we can immediately Armstrong-
derive [
E
R]A _ [
E
R]B by the identity rule. If BLi ( ALi , we either have 6 ∃CLi : ALi (
CLi ( BLi , which would mean that [
E
R]ALi _ [
E
R]BLi is explicitly included in λ(Li).
Otherwise (remember that Mi is finite, therefore there are only finitely many Li-closed
sets), we can find a finite sequence ALi = C0 ( . . . ( Cn = BLi of Li-closed sets with
6 ∃CLi : Ck ( CLi ( Ck+1 for any k with 0 ≤ k < n. Then, all [
E
R]CLik _ [
E
R]CLik+1 are
contained in λ(Li) and can be successively combined via the Armstrong-substitution rule
which ends up with an Armstrong-derivation of [
E
R]ALi _ [
E
R]BLi from λ(Li).
4. This can be shown in an analogous manner to case 2. If A _ B is valid in Ki, it is also
Armstrong-derivable from Li. If we take this derivation and exchange every attribute C with
A
R.C, we obviously obtain a valid derivation of {
A
R.A | A ∈ A}_{
A
R.B | B ∈ B} because
λ(Li) contains the “
A
-version” of Li.
5. Due to the fact that (.)Li is a closure operator, we find
C ⊆ CLi extensive
⇒ C ∪D ⊆ CLi ∪ D
⇒ (C ∪ D)Li ⊆ (CLi ∪ D)Li monotone
and
D ⊆ (C ∪ D)Li extensive
⇒ (C ∪ D)Li ∪ D = (C ∪ D)Li (*)
C ⊆ C ∪ D
⇒ CLi ⊆ (C ∪ D)Li monotone
⇒ CLi ∪ D ⊆ (C ∪ D)Li ∪ D
⇒ CLi ∪ D ⊆ (C ∪ D)Li due to (*)
⇒ (CLi ∪ D)Li ⊆ (C ∪ D)LiLi monotone
⇒ (CLi ∪ D)Li ⊆ (C ∪ D)Li idempotent,
hence: (CLi ∪ D)Li = (C ∪ D)Li for all C,D ⊆ Mi (**).
Now, let A1 = {A1, . . . , An} and let Ck := A2 ∪ {Aj | j ≤ k} for 0 ≤ k ≤ n. Then, for all
k = 0, . . . , n − 1, the implication
ik := {
A
R.Ak+1} ∪ [
E
R]CLik _ [
E
R](CLik ∪ {Ak+1})
Li
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(where – due to (**) – the conclusion equals [
E
R]CLik+1) is either contained in λ(Li) or can
be directly Armstrong-derived using identity and premise extension (if Ak+1 ∈ C
Li
k ). If we
iteratively combine those ik by Armstrong-substitution, we get
[
A
R]A1 ∪ [
E
R]ALi2 _ [
E
R](A1 ∪ A2)
Li
Furthermore, we know from case 3 that for any A_B valid in Ki, [
E
R]ALi _ [
E
R]BLi is
derivable from λ(Li). Therefore a last single Armstrong substitution gives
[
A
R]A1 ∪ [
E
R]ALi2 _ [
E
R]BLi.
❑
However, notice that this set λ(Li) of a-priori implications is not complete in the
sense that every implication on Mi+1 derivable from the implicational base Li on
Mi by using DR can be deduced from λ(Li) using the Armstrong rules.
Example 4.13 Let MC = {A, B, C}, MR = {R1, R2} and L1 consist of the follow-
ing implications:
i1 := {
E
R1.
d
∅,
E
R2.
d
∅} _ {A}
i2 := {
E
R1.
d
∅,
A
R2.⊥} _ {B}
i3 := {
E
R1.
d
A} _ {C}
i4 := {
E
R1.
d
B} _ {C}
Then, the implication {
E
R1.
E
R1.
d
∅} _ {C} is a semantic consequence of L1
justified by the derivation
∅ ⊸ {∅}
ID
∅ ⊸ {∅, {⊥}}
CE
∅ ⊸ {{
E
R2.
l
∅}, {
A
R2.⊥}}
AL
{
E
R1.
l
∅} ⊸ {{
E
R2.
l
∅,
E
R1.
l
∅}, {
A
R2.⊥,
E
R1.
l
∅}}
RES
i1
{
E
R1.
l
∅} ⊸ {{A}, {
A
R2.⊥,
E
R1.
l
∅}}
SUB*
i2
{
E
R1.
l
∅} ⊸ {{A}, {B}}
SUB*
{
E
R1.
E
R1.
l
∅} ⊸ {{
E
R1.A}, {
E
R1.B}}
EL
i3
{
E
R1.
E
R1.
l
∅} ⊸ {{C}, {
E
R1.B}}
SUB*
i4
{
E
R1.
E
R1.
l
∅} ⊸ {{C}}
SUB*
but not Armstrong-derivable from λ(L1).
This example emphasizes that a desirable property has not been achieved: while
exploring the formal context Ki+1, the attribute exploration algorithm might
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come up with potential implications that are necessarily valid in all binary power
context families that deliver Li as stem base of Ki, even if we provide λ(Li) as
a-priori implicational knowledge.
However, there are two reasons not to be too sad about this:
• Naturally, one could determine (a representation of) all Mi+1-implications
semantically entailed by Li: since Mi+1 is finite, the set of all implications is
finite as well. Hence, we could check in finite time, which ones are necessary
consequences of Li by applying the procedure described in Section 3.2 or a
DL reasoner. However, this approach is obviously “brute force” and would
be algorithmically costly (even if optimized). So λ(Li) contains just those
implications that can be calculated directly from Li with minimal effort.
• Furthermore, as we will point out in Chapter 5, in the intended application,
every potentially valid implication “asked” by the exploration algorithm will
first be passed to an automatic decision procedure, which would recognize
its derivability from Li and tacitly confirm it. Therefore, if the attribute
exploration method is supplemented by a decision algorithm for semantic
entailment of implications, no such redundant question will be presented to
the expert. Moreover, proceeding like this structures the way hypothetical
implications are brought up and thereby minimizes the number of calls to
the decision procedure (more than ever in comparison with the complete
“a-priori scan” sketched above).
Chapter 5
Algorithm Description
After all necessary theoretical considerations, we will now sketch the entire rela-
tional exploration algorithm.
Essentially, there are three instances involved:
1. The attribute exploration algorithm has been described in Section 1.4. It
organizes the question-and-answer process and makes sure that the impli-
cational theory on the used attributes is completely determined.
2. A decision procedure capable of deciding whether an FLEnorm subsumption
statement is valid in all binary power context families fulfilling a given set
of FLEnorm subsumption statements and possibly some additional prede-
termined restrictions (background knowledge).
This could be the decision procedure described in Section 3.2, in which case
the background knowledge would consist of cumulated clauses on FLEnorm.
This could as well be any DL reasoner – as e.g. FaCT (see [Ho99]) or
RACER (see [HM01]) – being the much more practical choice due to
• their high optimization with respect to time costs and
• the much greater variety of background knowledge that can be used
due to the greater expressiveness of the kind of DL most reasoners are
based on.
3. The expert knowing the universe which has to be explored and therefore
capable of answering all
−→
K -subsumption questions asked by the exploration
algorithm.
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As indicated before, it will be an iteratively organized process where the maximal
role depth of the considered concept descriptions will be successively incremented.
Every single step of this procedure is subdivided into three phases: attribute gen-
eration, background knowledge explication, and (semi-)interactive exploration.
5.1 Attribute Generation
In this phase, we stipulate the attribute set Mi ⊆ FLE
norm based on the in-
formation collected in the previous exploration steps. If i = 0, we simply set
M0 := MC ∪ {⊥}. Otherwise, we use the closure operator cli−1 represented by
the implicational base Li−1 explored in the previous step in order to generate an
empirically reduced set of attributes. The new set of attributes then comprises:
• all primitive concept descriptions MC as well as the ⊥-concept,
• for every concept description C ∈ Mi−1, the all-quantified versions
A
R.C for
every R ∈ MR, and
• for every set of concept descriptions C ⊆ Mi−1 that is closed with respect
to cli−1 and does not contain ⊥, the existentially quantified conjunction
E
R.
d
C for every R ∈ MR.
As Theorem 4.8 formally shows, this set is roughly spoken still sufficient to com-
prehensively “talk about” the considered binary power context family in FLE-
terms.
5.2 Background Knowledge Explication
After having stipulated the attribute set for the current exploration step, we can
determine the implications that can be added as a-priori knowledge. In order to
do that, we exploit the previous implicational base Li−1, and determine the set
of prior implications in the following way:
• add
{⊥}_Mi,
• for every implication A_B from Li−1, add
{Ã | τi(A) = {Ã}, A ∈ A}_{B̃ | τi(B) = {B̃}, B ∈ B},
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• for every implication A_B from Li−1, add
{
A
R.A | A ∈ A}_{
A
R.B | B ∈ B},
• for all cli−1-closed sets A,B ⊆ Mi−1 with A ( B where there is no cli−1-
closed set C with A ( C ( B, add
{
E
R.
d
A}_{
E
R.
d
B}, and
• for every cli-closed set A ⊆ Mi−1 \ A and every concept description A ∈
Mi−1, add
{
E
R.
d
A,
A
R.A}_{
E
R.
d
cli−1(A ∪ {A})}.
In doing this, we deliver implicational knowledge that trivially follows from for-
mer exploration steps prior to engaging in the next interactive exploration phase.
The “observable behavior” of the system (i.e., the questions asked to the human
expert) would be the same without that preparation, since the used decision pro-
cedure would automatically answer questions concerning this kind of knowledge.
However, providing this knowledge in advance obviously reduces the number of
calls to the decision procedure, which are assumed to be costly.
5.3 Interactive Exploration
After all these preparations, the actual exploration process as described in Section
1.4 takes place on the attribute set Mi.
Assume, the algorithm comes up with a hypothetical implication
A_B.
This question has to be interpreted in the following way:
“Does every entity δ from the universe ∆ of the considered binary
power context family that fulfills all concept descriptions from A
also fulfill every concept description from B?”
The first thing to do is to check this question against the facts already known.
For, if the implication in question would be valid in any model compatible with
all our predetermined background knowledge and the implicational knowledge
acquired so far, it would be valid also in the very considered model. This can
be decided by any subsumption decision algorithm for some description logic
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containing FLE and general concept inclusion axioms. So, we query the decision
algorithm whether
d
A ⊑
d
B can be inferred from the specified knowledge.
Now, assume that the decision algorithm can prove that A_B is a consequence
of the facts already known. In this case, the question of the exploration algo-
rithm is tacitly (i.e., without bothering the expert) answered with “yes” and the
exploration continues.
If the validity of the implication cannot be proven from the known facts, the
question will be passed to the domain expert. (S)he has to decide whether the
asked implication is true for all entities of the considered universe. If this is
the case, the implication is confirmed to the exploration algorithm and added
to the domain specification (the TBox, respectively). If not, (s)he provides a
counterexample δ with δ |= A but δ 6|= B (which could also be added to the
ABox) and the exploration process will be continued.
At the end of this phase, we have an implicational base Li for Mi and thus a
means to decide any
−→
K -subsumption statement on FLE i as we have shown in
Theorem 4.8. Furthermore, Li is a representation of the closure operator cli and
thus provides all information necessary for the next exploration step.
Chapter 6
Termination
Although the exploration process just described will have to be stopped after few
steps in most practical cases due to the drastic increase of time costs, at least
from the theoretical point of view the question emerges, whether and under which
circumstances the proposed algorithm terminates, i.e., all information necessary
to decide any
−→
K -subsumption statement on FLE (of arbitrary role depth) has
been acquired. We will show that this is the case precisely if the following property
is fulfilled:
Definition 6.1 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family and let (Ki) be the ac-
cording sequence of formal contexts as defined in Definition 4.4. Furthermore, let
(Li) be the corresponding sequence of implicational bases.
−→
K will be called finitely FLE-characterizable if there is an n ∈ N such
that the mapping Fn : {ALn | A ⊆ Mn} → {BLn+1 | B ⊆ Mn+1} with Fn(A) :=
τ̄n+1(
d
A) is a bijection between the Ln-closed subsets from Mn and the Ln+1-
closed subsets from Mn+1. ❑
In the subsequent theorems, we show that this criterion is sufficient by providing
a way to decide whether any
−→
K -subsumption statement on FLE holds by using
just the implicational bases L0, . . . ,Ln+1
Theorem 6.2 Let
−→
K be a finitely FLE-characterizable binary power context fa-
mily and n be the natural number for which Fn is a bijection. Then
1. For any B = BLn+1 ⊆ Mn+1 and A = F−1n (B) we have
d
A ≡−→
K
d
B.
2. For any C ∈ FLEn+1 we have C ≡−→K
d
F−1n (τ̄n+1(C)).
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Proof:
Because A ⊆ Mn, we know
d
A ≡−→
K
d
τ̄n+1(
d
A) due to Theorem 4.8. By definition of Fn, we
see that the right hand side of the equivalence is just
d
Fn(A). Since Fn(A) = B, we are done.
The second proposition can then be proven as follows: We know C ≡−→
K
d
τ̄n+1(C) by Theorem 4.8.
From the first part of this theorem it follows that
d
(τ̄n+1(C)) ≡−→
K
d
F−1n (τ̄n+1(C)). ❑
This theorem provides a way to “shrink” an FLEn+1 concept description to max-
imal role depth n preserving its semantics with respect to
−→
K . But – exploiting
this fact – we can do even more: for any concept description C ∈ FLE (i.e., of
arbitrary role depth), we find an “empirically equivalent”1 concept description
C̃ ∈ FLEn by applying the function π : FLE → FLEn with2
D 7→ D for all D ∈ MC ∪ {⊥}
E
R.D 7→
{ d
[
E
R](τ̄n−1(D)) if
E
R.D ∈ FLEn,
d
F−1n ([
E
R](τ̄n(π(D))))
Ln+1 otherwise.
A
R.D 7→
{ d
[
A
R]τ̄n−1(D) if
A
R.D ∈ FLEn,
d
F−1n ([
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 otherwise.
d
D 7→
d
{π(D) | D ∈ D}.
Theorem 6.3 Let
−→
K be a finitely FLE-characterizable binary power context fa-
mily. Then for any C ∈ FLE we have π(C) ∈ FLEn and π(C) ≡−→K C.
Proof:
Let n ∈ N be the smallest natural number for which Fn is a bijection. This proof will be done by
induction on the maximal role depth of C. We have to consider the following cases:
• C ∈ MC ∪ {⊥}.
This is trivial: C ≡−→
K
C = π(C).
• C =
E
R.D ∈ FLEn.
Applying Theorem 4.8 yields D ≡−→
K
d
τ̄n−1(D), directly implying
E
R.D ≡−→
K
d
[
E
R]τ̄n−1(D) =
π(C). Since τ̄n−1(D) ⊆ FLEn−1, we also have π(C) ∈ FLEn.
• C =
E
R.D 6∈ FLEn.
By induction hypothesis, D ≡−→
K
π(D) and π(D) ∈ FLEn. Theorem 4.8 gives us π(D) ≡−→
Kd
τ̄n(π(D)). From this, we conclude
E
R.D ≡−→
K
d
[
E
R]τ̄n(π(D)). Notice that the equivalence’s
right hand side is in Mn+1 due to Theorem 4.6 and the definition of Mn+1. By applying
Lemma 4.7, we get
d
[
E
R]τ̄n(π(D)) ≡−→
K
d
([
E
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 and by Theorem 6.2 we have
d
([
E
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 ≡−→
K
d
F−1n ([
E
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 = π(C). So we have shown C ≡−→
K
π(C).
The application of F−1n assures π(C) ∈ FLEn.
1i.e.,
−→
K -equivalent
2 In this notation, (.)L binds stronger than F−1n , τ̄n, τ̄n−1, [
A
R], and [
E
R].
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• C =
A
R.D ∈ FLEn.
Applying Theorem 4.8 yields D ≡−→
K
d
τ̄n−1(D), directly implying
A
R.D ≡−→
K
d
[
A
R]τ̄n−1(D) =
π(C). Since τ̄n−1(D) ⊆ FLEn−1, we also have π(C) ∈ FLEn.
• C =
A
R.D 6∈ FLEn.
By induction hypothesis, D ≡−→
K
π(D) and π(D) ∈ FLEn. Theorem 4.8 gives us π(D) ≡−→
Kd
τ̄n(π(D)). From this, we conclude
A
R.D ≡−→
K
d
[
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)). Notice that [
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)) ⊆
Mn+1 due to Theorem 4.6 and the definition of Mn+1. By applying Lemma 4.7, we get
d
[
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)) ≡−→
K
d
([
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 and by the first proposition of Theorem 6.2 we
have
d
([
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 ≡−→
K
d
F−1n ([
A
R]τ̄n(π(D)))
Ln+1 = π(C). So we have shown C ≡−→
K
π(C). The application of F−1n assures π(C) ∈ FLEn.
• C =
d
D.
W.l.o.g., we can assume that every D ∈ D has no conjunction outside the range of a quantifier,
thus, one of the cases above is applicable. Therefore, we know π(D) ∈ FLEn and D ≡−→
K
π(D)
for every D ∈ D. This implies
d
D ≡−→
K
d
{π(D) | D ∈ D} = π(C) as well as π(C) ∈ FLEn.
❑
In words, the π function just realizes the following transformation: beginning
from “inside” the concept expression C, subformulae having maximal role depth
of n + 1 are substituted by
−→
K -equivalent ones with smaller role depth. When
applied iteratively, this results in a concept description C̃ from FLEn that is
−→
K -
equivalent to the original one. The validity of this concept description can now
be checked by the method described in the preceding section.
It remains to show that the above mentioned bijection property is also a necessary
criterion. This is a direct consequence from the next lemma.
Lemma 6.4 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family that is not finitely FLE-
characterizable. Then there exists no n ∈ N such that the set of valid
−→
K -
subsumption statements on FLEn determines the validity for all
−→
K -subsumption
statements on whole FLE.
Proof:
Assume the contrary. Let then I be the set of all FLEn subsumption statements valid in
−→
K ,
coded as cumulated clauses on FLEnorm. Now, consider the n-limited standard model
−→
Kn(I) as
described in Definition 3.22. As a direct consequence of Lemma 3.23, it satisfies exactly those
subsumption statements from I. Furthermore, by construction,
−→
Kn(I) (precisely: the underlying
universe ∆−→
K n(I)
) is finite. We now consider the sequence (K̃k) defined for
−→
Kn(I) (as described
in Definition 4.4) and can conclude that for all k ∈ N, the number of formal concepts of any Kk
is bounded by 2
|∆−→
K n(I)
|
. On the other hand, for the sequence (Kk) defined for
−→
K , every concept
lattice has more formal concepts than its predecessor. Therefore, the concept lattices for K̃k and Kk
cannot be isomorphic for all k (in fact, they are certainly not isomorphic for every k > 2
|∆−→
K n(I)
|
).
Thus, the implicational theories of K̃k and Kk are not equal. So, we have found two models the
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implicational theories of which coincide on FLEn yet differ on FLE . This clearly contradicts the
assumption. ❑
It is easy to show that being finitely FLE-characterizable as termination criterion
is equivalent to the finiteness of FLE/≡−→
K
, which is trivially fulfilled, if ∆ is finite.
Chapter 7
A Small Example
After having presented the algorithm in theory, we will provide an easy example
for this method in order to show what type of information we can expect from it.
The advantage of choosing an example from mathematics is that the danger of
diverging opinions about the correct answer to a question is rather low – apart
from open problems.
So, let the considered universe ∆ be the natural numbers including zero. Fur-
thermore, let MC and MR be defined as shown in Figure 7.1 on the left. Carrying
out the exploration on K0 (where the attributes M0 are just the elements from
MC plus ⊥) we get the implicational base L0 shown in Figure 7.1 on the right.
This first exploration step is essentially “ordinary” attribute exploration, since no
interrelations between domain entities (mediated by roles or binary predicates,
respectively) have been taken into account by now. This changes now.
We generate the attribute set M1 for the next exploration step as follows: First,
we reuse all attributes from M0, second, we take the conjunction over any L0-
closed subset of M0 \ {⊥} preceded by an existential quantifier, and third, we
include all combinations of a universal quantifier and one attribute from M0.
Figure 7.2 lists the attributes from M1.
Then, we generate a-priori knowledge for the second exploration step. First, we
use the information collected so far. When proceeding from the first (i = 0) to
the second (i = 1) step, we simply can use L0 as additional a priori information
without further adaption because M0 ⊆ M1. Furthermore, applying the deduc-
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C ∈ MC name CIC
Ev even {2n | n ∈ N}
Od odd {2n + 1 | n ∈ N}
Pr prime {n ≥ 2 | kl = n ⇒ k ∈ {1, n}}
E0 equals zero {0}
E1 equals one {1}
E2 equals two {2}
G2 greater than two {n ∈ N | n ≥ 3}
R ∈ MR name R
IR
s successor {(n, n + 1) | n ∈ N}
p predecessor {(n + 1, n) | n ∈ N}
d divisor {(m, n) | ∃k ∈ N : m = kn}
m multiple {(n, m) | ∃k ∈ N : m = kn}
{E0} _ {Ev}
{E1} _ {Od}
{E2} _ {Ev,Pr}
{Ev, Pr} _ {E2}
{Od, Pr} _ {G2}
{Pr, G2} _ {Od}
{Ev, Od} _ {⊥}
{G2, E0} _ {⊥}
{G2, E1} _ {⊥}
{E0, E2} _ {⊥}
Figure 7.1: Attributes MC, MR and definition of the incidence relations IC, IR
for the example and the implicational base L0 resulting from the first exploration
step.
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Figure 7.2: Attributes M1 for the second exploration step.
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tion consequences mentioned in Section 4.3 we can add numerous implications
for instance:
• {⊥}_M1,
• {
E
s.(Od ⊓ G2 ⊓ Pr)}_{
E
s.(Od ⊓ G2)},
• {
E
s.Pr,
A
s.G2}_{
E
s.(Od ⊓ G2 ⊓ Pr)}, and
• {
A
p.Ev,
A
p.Od}_{
A
p.⊥}.
After these preparations, the next exploration step is invoked. We visualize its
result by the according concept lattice in Figure 7.3.
As an example, we will now demonstrate how to check the validity of the
−→
K -
subsumption statement
Pr ⊓
E
s.(Od ⊓ Pr) ⊑−→
K
E2,
verbally: “is two the only prime number having an odd prime successor?” Now,
we carry out the necessary calculations and find
τ1(Pr ⊓
E
s.(Od ⊓ Pr))
= τ1(Pr) ∪ τ1(
E
s.(Od ⊓ Pr))
= τ1(Pr) ∪ [
E
s](τ̄0(Od ⊓ Pr))
= τ1(Pr) ∪ [
E
s](τ0(Od ⊓ Pr))L0
= τ1(Pr) ∪ [
E
s](τ0(Od) ∪ τ0(Pr))
L0
= {Pr} ∪ [
E
s]{Od, Pr}L0
= {Pr} ∪ [
E
s]{Od, Pr, G2}
= {Pr,
E
s.(Od ⊓ Pr ⊓ G2)}
as well as
τ1(E2) = {E2}.
When applying the L1-closure to both sets to obtain the values for τ̄1 (the result is
to large to be displayed here but can be derived from the line diagram in Figure
7.3), we find the outcomes even identical. Thus, in view of Corollary 4.9, the
validity of our hypothetical
−→
K -subsumption statement can be confirmed.
Finally, we deal with the question whether the exploration algorithm terminates
in our case after some step. This has to be denied for the following reason.
Consider the infinite sequence E0,
E
p.E0,
E
p.
E
p.E0, . . .. Every concept descrip-
tion in this sequence is satisfied by exactly one natural number. Moreover, these
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numbers are all pairwise different. Therefore, every concept description of the
sequence is in another ≡−→
K
-equivalence class, thus FLE/≡−→
K
is infinite. Hence, the
algorithm does not terminate due to the concluding remark in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 8
Ontology Refinement
As already stated, we think the proposed algorithm could be very helpful in
designing conceptual descriptions of world aspects. Markup ontologies are a very
popular example for this. So, in this chapter, we will briefly introduce ontologies,
refer to the current standards, and describe how the proposed methods can be
helpful in this area.
8.1 On Ontologies
The Web provides a huge amount of documents and services and is still rapidly
increasing. But, due to its necessarily decentral and non-hierarchic organization,
the search for the desired piece of information has become a difficult and tedious
task for human users. Therefore, powerful tools for information retrieval on the
Web are indispensable to fully exploit its potential. However, the overwhelming
majority of Web documents has been designed for human consumers, i.e., amongst
others
• the information is given in natural language and
• it relies on background knowledge which is shared by (or even commonplace
to) most humans.
Thus, most of the information retrieval tools provided today (or at least those
most widely used) are restricted to keyword searches.
While one could try to overcome the first problem with natural language process-
ing technologies (which is in our opinion not developed enough to be successful in
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this task and would anyway leave the language-inherent ambiguities unresolved)
the second one would still persist.
One alternative would be to provide machine-readable descriptions of the content
and capabilities of Web resources and thus making the semantics of the data more
explicit and thus better accessible for non-human agents. This aim constitutes
the idea of the Semantic Web:
The Semantic Web is a vision for the future of the Web in which
information is given explicit meaning, making it easier for machines
to automatically process and integrate information available on the
Web. ([He04])
Due to [Gr93], an ontology is “an explicit specification of a conceptualization.”
Indeed, the basic ideas strongly resemble the conceptual thinking usual in DL
and FCA.
In [NoMG01], Noy and McGuinness enumerate purposes for developing an ontol-
ogy. Due to them, an ontology should assist
• sharing common understanding of the structure of information among peo-
ple or software agents,
• enabling reuse of domain knowledge,
• making domain assumptions explicit,
• separating domain knowledge from the operational knowledge, and
• analyzing domain knowledge.
To achieve these goals, a language is needed, wherein the meaning of the termi-
nology used in Web documents can be formally described. It must be able to
specify class hierarchies as well as information about relations between classes.
In recent years, Description Logics have been highly influential to the devel-
opment of logic standards for the semantic web (see e.g. [Sa03]). They have
been used as formal base for defining OWL – the web ontology language (see
[MGvH04]).
OWL has been designed to offer more facilities for expressing meaning and se-
mantics than previous standard content specification languages (as XML, RDF,
and RDF-S). Moreover, due to its close relationship to DL, well-tried optimized
DL reasoners can be used to deal with inference questions.
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8.2 Structured Search for New Ontology Ax-
ioms
We are confident that FCA can contribute to the development and refinement of
ontologies (see also [GaSt03] for another application of FCA to ontology related
problems). Here, we will describe how the algorithm proposed in the previous
chapters can be used to construct or refine an ontology by an organized search for
new general concept inclusion axioms of a certain shape (namely those expressible
by FLE concept constructors).
Clearly, the description logics OWL is based on are much more complex than
FLE . Nonetheless, our algorithm is still applicable as long as there are com-
plete reasoning algorithms for deciding subsumption (as for instance the FaCT
or RACER, both capable of reasoning in SHIQ(D) - see [HST00]). All infor-
mation beyond FLE is treated as background knowledge and “hidden” from the
exploration algorithm.
After stipulating the names of concepts and roles, the next step in designing or
refining an ontology would be to define axioms or rules stating how the specified
concepts (resp. classes) are interrelated. The exploration algorithm can support
this tedious and error-prone task by guiding the expert. Every potential axiom
the algorithm comes up with will first be passed to the employed reasoning al-
gorithm. If this axiom can be proven based on the knowledge already present
in the OWL domain specification, it will be confirmed to the algorithm, if not,
the human expert has to be asked. If (s)he judges the rule to be generally valid
in the considered domain, a genuinely new axiom1 has been found and can be
incorporated into the ontology description. Otherwise, the expert has to enter a
counterexample, which violates the hypothetical axiom. If the ontology descrip-
tion is meant to contain information about individuals, this counterexample can
be added to it as well.
One advantage of applying this technique is the guarantee that all axioms express-
ible as subsumption statements on FLE with a certain role depth will certainly
be found and specified.
In turn, we want to reply to a possible remark from the point of view of DL: one
could object that sometimes or even most times ontologies are designed for several
different domains, such that an expert would not want to commit himself to one
1i.e., one not already logically entailed by the present specification
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specific domain, as it seems necessary when applying this algorithm. However,
from the mathematical point of view, this is not a severe problem: we just take
the disjoint union of all domains we want to describe as reference domain of our
exploration. A rule would be valid in this “superdomain” if and only if it is valid
in all of the original domains.
Consequently, we are very confident that an implementation of this algorithm
could be a very helpful tool in order to build and refine domain descriptions –
not only for working with ontologies. As there is a strong relationship between DL
and modal logic (which in turn can be enriched by temporal and epistemic fea-
tures), describing discrete dynamic systems and multi agent systems are further
promising potential applications – see Chapter 9 for an outlook.
Chapter 9
Perspectives
In this chapter, we will briefly point out directions for further research and sketch
possible applications.
On one hand, several extensions or modifications of the presented exploration
algorithm itself appear possible. Sections 9.1 to 9.5 will discuss these theoretical
issues.
On the other hand, we will argue that possible applications of the described
technique are not restricted to ontologies. In Section 9.6, we sketch two further
scenarios where the algorithm could be used.
9.1 Exploiting Knowledge about Roles
Sometimes, certain properties of the roles are known in advance. This knowledge
can be used to state additional implications on Mi before starting exploration. In
the sequel, we state implications to be added for some “popular” role properties:
• If R is reflexive, the implications
{
A
R.C}_{(C)i}
for any C ∈ Mi−1 as well as
{(C)i | C ∈ C}_ [
E
R]C
for any cli−1-closed C ⊆ Mi−1 are valid in Ki.
• If R is symmetric, the implications
{(C)i | C ∈ C}_ [
A
R][
E
R]C
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for any cli−2-closed C ⊆ Mi−2 and
[
E
R]cli−1(
A
R.C)_{(C)i}
for any C ∈ Mi−2 hold in Ki.
• If R is transitive, the implications
{
A
R.(C)i−1}_{
A
R.
A
R.C}
for any C ∈ Mi−2 and
[
E
R]cli−1([
E
R]C)_ [
E
R]cli−1{(C)i−1 | C ∈ C}
for any cli−2-closed C ⊆ Mi−2 are valid in Ki.
• If R is functional1 the implications
[
A
R]C_ [
E
R]C
as well as
[
E
R]C_ [
A
R]C
for any cli−1-closed C ⊆ Mi−1 are valid in Ki.2
The case of role inclusion can be treated similarly. If we know in advance that
for two roles R1, R2 ∈ MR we have R
IR
1 ⊆ R
IR
2 , we can obviously add
{
A
R2.C}_{
A
R1.C}
for any C ∈ Mi−1 as well as
{[
E
R1]C}_{[
E
R2]C}
for any cli−1-closed C ⊆ Mi−1 to the a-priori implications for Ki.
1 A role R is called functional if for every δ ∈ ∆, there is exactly one δ̃ ∈ ∆ with (δ, δ̃)IRR.
2 In this last case, we can even modify the way attributes are generated for the exploration
of Ki. Obviously, for a functional role R holds
A
R.C ≡
E
R.C for any concept description C. Thus
we can work without all the existentially quantified attributes and just use the universally
quantified ones (omitting
A
R.⊥ as well, since we have
A
R.⊥ ≡−→
K
E
R.⊥ ≡ ⊥).
9.2 Alternative Ways of Coding 91
9.2 Alternative Ways of Coding
Certainly, FLE-contexts do not represent the only way to encode – and conse-
quently explore – (binary) relational information. Subsequently, we will sketch
some alternative ways to do so.
9.2.1 Role contexts
One of those possibilities has been described in [GaRu01]. We will shortly sketch
a generalized version of this approach.
Definition 9.1 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family, R ∈ MR, and C a set of
concept descriptions of some DL. The R-context, KR(C) is defined by
KR := ({(δ1, δ2) | (δ1, δ2)IRR}, C × {1, 2}, IR)
where
(δ1, δ2)IR(C, i) :⇔ δi |= C.
❑
In words, the object set of this formal context consists of those entity pairs (δ1, δ2)
that are “connected” by role R and for every concept description D ∈ C the context
states, whether D is valid in δ1 and whether it is valid in δ2.
It is rather easy to establish a direct correspondence between simple implications3
valid in an R-context and
−→
K -subsumption statements:
Lemma 9.2 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family, R ∈ MR, and C a set of
concept descriptions of some DL. Then for D, E ⊆ C and C ∈ C we have
D × {1} ∪ E × {2}_{(C, 1)} ⇐⇒
d
D ⊓
E
R.
d
E ⊑−→
K
C and
D × {1} ∪ E × {2}_{(C, 2)} ⇐⇒
d
D ⊓
E
R.
d
(E ∪ {¬C}) ⊑−→
K
⊥
provided, ¬C can be described in the DL used.
3 An implication A _ B is called simple, if |B| = 1. Trivially, an arbitrary implication
A_B can be equivalently expressed by |B| simple implications.
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9.2.2 Binary Rule Exploration
FLE is less expressive than the description logic ALC and ALC can be seen
as a fragment of first order logic with at most binary predicates and at most 2
variables (see [Ba03]). In FCA, there have been other approaches to deal with
first order logic fragments, e.g. rule exploration (see [Zi91]) where the Horn logic
of a domain is explored. So another alternative way for exploring a binary power
context family could be described as follows:
Definition 9.3 Let
−→
K be a binary power context family and X an arbitrary set,
called variables. We define the rule context :
KX := (∆
X , MX , IX)
with
MX := (MC × X) ∪ (MR × X2) ∪ {⊥},
fIX(A, x) ⇔ f(x)ICA,
fIX(R, x, y) ⇔ (f(x), f(y))IRR, and
(f,⊥) 6∈ IX .
❑
In words, the objects of our context are not entities from the universe but variable
assignments. The attributes represent predicate logic literals (where primitive
concepts are interpreted as unary predicates and primitive roles as binary predi-
cates). The incidence relation tells, whether a literal is true in
−→
K with respect to
the variable assignment. By exploring this context (where we can exploit natural
symmetries induced by permutations on the variable set), we get an implicational
base for the logic of Horn clauses (see [Zi91] for a thorough treatise).
This is a rather general approach. Depending on the cardinality of X, a lot
of different facts about the binary power context family can be expressed by
implications on MX , for instance (let x, y, z ∈ X):
• R is reflexive
∅_{(R, x, x)}
• R is symmetric
{(R, x, y)}_{(R, y, x)}
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• R is transitive
{(R, x, y), (R, y, z)}_{(R, x, z)}
• R1 ⊆ R2
{(R1, x, y)}_{(R2, x, y)}
• every statement expressible by any R-context: if
KR |= A× {1} ∪ B × {2}_C × {1} ∪ D × {2}
then
KX |=
{(R1, x, y)} ∪ {(C, x) | C ∈ A} ∪ {(C, y) | C ∈ B}
_{(C, x) | C ∈ C} ∪ {(C, y) | C ∈ D}.
Remark 9.4 While the relational exploration algorithm presented in this work
does not cover all kind of information collectable by rule exploration, the opposite
does not hold either: For instance, the KX -implication
{(R1, x, y), (R2, y, x)}_{⊥}
has no KFLE counterpart (one would need a much more expressive DL includ-
ing full Boolean role constructors for this). Vice versa, the KFLE implication
{
A
R.C} _ {
E
R.D} cannot be expressed in a rule context with arbitrary many
variables.
9.3 Partial or Uncertain Knowledge
Obviously, not in every case, the expert has complete knowledge about the uni-
verse. Many different approaches have been proposed to incorporate partial or
uncertain information into FCA (see [Bu91], [Ga96], [Ho01]). We will sketch an
approach related to [Ga96].
Definition 9.5 A partial formal context K? is a quadruple (G, M, I2, I3)
where (G, M, I2) and (G, M, I3) are formal contexts and I2 ⊆ I3. The operators
(.)I
2
and (.)I
3
are defined as usual. ❑
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The meaning of this definition is the following: gI2m means, it is certain that
object g has the attribute m, while gI3m means, it is possible that object g has
the attribute m or – in other words – it is not certain that object g does not have
the attribute m. An intuitive visualization would be a cross table having crosses
where gI2m, blanks where not gI3m and question marks anywhere else.
Definition 9.6 A formal context K = (G, M, I) will be called completion of
a partial formal context K? = (G, M, I2, I3), if I2 ⊆ I ⊆ I3. ❑
Note that every formal context in the original sense can be considered as a par-
ticular partial formal context with I2 = I3 = I.
Definition 9.7 Let G, M be arbitrary but fixed sets. We define the informa-
tion order on the set of all partial formal contexts with object set G and at-
tribute set M as follows:
K?1 E K
?
2 :⇐⇒ I
2
1 ⊆ I
2
2 ∧ I
3
2 ⊆ I
3
1
❑
It is obvious that this definition of the information order directly corresponds to
the notion of completion: if K?1 E K
?
2, then every completion of K
?
2 is a completion
of K?1.
Definition 9.8 An implication A_B with A, B ⊆ M is possibly valid (also
holds possibly) in a partial context K? if it is valid in (at least) one completion
of K?. ❑
Clearly, if we consider a partial formal context with I2 = I3, the notions of
validity and possible validity coincide.
Theorem 9.9 Let K? be a partial formal context. Then for all A, B ⊆ M , we
have that A_B holds possibly in K? exactly if B ⊆ AI
2I3.
Proof:
“⇒” If the implication A_B is possibly valid in K?, there is a completion K = (G, M, I), where
it is valid. But then in K we have also B ⊆ AII . So, it suffices to show that AII ⊆ AI
2I3 .
Due to I2 ⊆ I we have AI
2
⊆ AI and due to I ⊆ I3 this implies AII ⊆ AI
2I3 . So we are
done.
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“⇐” Suppose B ⊆ AI
2I3 . Obviously, K̂ := (G, M, IA) with IA = I
2 ∪ (I3 ∩ (AI
2
× M)) is a
completion of K?.
If we consider that
gIAa ⇔ gI
2a ∨ (gI3a ∧ (∀ã ∈ A : gI2ã))
and additionally assume a ∈ A, we find the second part of the disjunction to be a special
case of the first and conclude gIAa ⇔ gI2a. This immediately implies AIA = AI
2
.(*)
Again considering the equivalence above, now assuming g ∈ AI
2
and a being arbitrary,
the second part of the conjunction in parentheses is true due to our assumption. Hence,
the first part of the disjunction implies the second one (because I2 ⊆ I3) and therefore
gIAa ⇔ gI3a. This in turn gives AI
2IA = AI
2I3 . Together with (*), this directly implies
AIAIA = AI
2I3 which allows to conclude B ⊆ AIAIA . Therefore, A_B holds in K̂. Yet,
K̂ is a completion of K?, thus, A_B holds possibly in K?.
❑
By now, we have defined the formalization of the idea that some implication
“might hold” in a partial formal context. The contrary would be that an impli-
cation “does certainly not hold” – as a means to witness this, we introduce the
notion of a guaranteed counterexample.
Definition 9.10 Let K? = (G, M, I2, I3) be a partial formal context and i =
A_B an implication on the attribute set. We will call an object g ∈ G guar-
anteed counterexample for i if A ⊆ gI
2
and B 6⊆ gI
3
. ❑
Theorem 9.11 An implication i = A_B holds possibly in a partial formal con-
text K? = (G, M, I2, I3) if and only if K? contains no guaranteed counterexample
for i.
Proof:
By Theorem 9.9, we have that A_B holds possibly in a partial formal context exactly if B ⊆ AI
2I3 .
Then we can conclude
B ⊆ AI
2I3
⇔ AI
2
⊆ BI
3
⇔ ¬∃g ∈ G : g ∈ AI
2
∧ g 6∈ BI
3
⇔ ¬∃g ∈ G : A ⊆ gI
2
∧ B 6⊆ gI
3
which just means, that K? does not contain a guaranteed counterexample for A_B. ❑
Definition 9.12 A partial formal context K? = (G, M, I2, I3) will be called
consistent with an implication set I if it does not contain a guaranteed coun-
terexample for any of the implications from I. ❑
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Note that this property is equivalent to the existence of a completion of K? that
respects all implications from I.
Definition 9.13 Let K? = (G, M, I2, I3) be a partial formal context and I be a
set of implications on M . An object g ∈ G will be called I-revised, if
• gI
2
= (gI
2
)I and
• (gI
2
∪ {m})I ⊆ gI
3
for all m ∈ gI
3
A partial formal context K? will be called I-revised if all its objects g ∈ G are
I-revised. ❑
Furthermore, it is not difficult to show that for every partial formal context K? =
(G, M, I2, I3) compatible with an implication set I, there is exactly one (with
respect to E) minimal I-revised partial formal context K?
I
with K? E K?
I
. Then,
every completion of K? respecting all implications from I is also a completion of
K?
I
.
In words, I-revising a context K?
I
is a way to make a partial context K? more spe-
cific using knowledge about valid implications while preserving all its “completion
potential”.
Having these notions at hand, the attribute exploration algorithm described in
Section 1.4 can be adapted to handle incomplete knowledge as follows:
• We operate on the partial context K?.
• The algorithm comes up with implications that are possibly valid in K?.
The expert knows, whether such an implication i is valid in the explored
universe or not.
◆ If (s)he confirms the implication, it is added to the implicational base L
and the partial context K? will be substituted by its L-revised version.
◆ If (s)he denies it, (s)he has to provide a counterexample g. However,
the counterexample does not need to be completely specified. It just
needs to be a guaranteed counterexample for i. The L-revised version
of g will be added to K?.
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This extension of the original algorithm gives some advantages for the relational
exploration proposed in this work: when proceeding from Ki to Ki+1 we can not
only “reuse” Li but also the counterexample set Gi entered while exploring Ki
(or already present before as a-priori knowledge). As described in Section 4.2,
for any attribute C ∈ Mi there exists an attribute (C)i+1 ∈ Mi+1 with C ≡ −→K
(C)i+1. So we can use the set Gi with
• gI
2
i+1 := {(m)i+1 | m ∈ gI
2
i} and
• gI
3
i+1 := Mi+1 \ {(m)i+1 | m ∈ (Mi \ gI
3
i)}
(respectively their λ(Li)-revised versions) as a-priori objects for the exploration
of Ki+1. In fact, this is the way how we can make the algorithm “remember” the
denied implications from previous exploration steps.
A further notion worth considering in this regard would be that of a partial bi-
nary power context family where KC and KR are partial formal contexts. This
corresponds to databases with incomplete information. The connection of partial
binary power context family and partial FLE-contexts would have to be studied.
9.4 Permutations on Attributes
Sometimes, a domain of discourse is known to have symmetries that can be
expressed by permutations (resp. automorphisms) on the attributes. Consider
the following “toy example”:
Example 9.14 Imagine, we would like to build an ontology referring to terms
about genealogy. We might stipulate the following concept and role names:
MC = {Female, Male, Parent, Mother, Father,
Grandparent, Grandmother, Grandfather}
MR = {HasChild, HasSon, HasDaughter, HasParent}
Now, we would easily find the following true statements:
E
HasSon.⊤ ⊑
E
HasChild.Male
E
HasDaughter.⊤ ⊑
E
HasChild.Female
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Note that one of these statements can be constructed out of the other one by
substituting all male terms by female terms and vice versa. Formally, we could
define two permutations σC : MC → MC and σR : MR → MR with
σC :



Male 7→ Female
Female 7→ Male
Parent 7→ Parent
Mother 7→ Father
Father 7→ Mother
Grandparent 7→ Grandparent
Grandmother 7→ Grandfather
Grandfather 7→ Grandmother
and
σR :



HasChild 7→ HasChild
HasSon 7→ HasDaughter
HasDaughter 7→ HasSon
HasParent 7→ HasParent
that describe this substitution on the concept and role names. This can be
canonically extended to FLE by defining σ : FLE → FLE with:
σ(C) = σC(C) for C ∈ MC ∪ ⊥
σ(
d
C) =
⋃
{σ(C) | C ∈ C}
σ(
A
R.C) =
A
σR(R).σ(C)
σ(
E
R.C) =
E
σR(R).σ(C).
In general, there could be more than one such truth preserving permutation
on FLE . Knowing that the permutations σ1, . . . , σn behave in that way, the
same would be true for any element of the permutation group generated by
{σ1, . . . , σn}. In [Ga90] it has been described how such information (given as
generating set of the group of truth preserving permutations on the attribute set)
can be effectively incorporated in the exploration process resulting in a reduction
of questions asked to the expert. In our opinion, the example above substanti-
ates the idea that an integration of this feature into the relational exploration
algorithm presented in this work could be quite useful in practice.
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9.5 Using more Expressive DLs
As already mentioned in Section 8.2, if DL reasoners are employed, the utilizable
background knowledge is not restricted to FLE , but can be expressed in any
formalism the reasoner is able to deal with.
However, in some cases, it could be desirable to explore the complete knowledge
not only in terms of FLE subsumption statements but also of some more expres-
sive DL (as, say, ALE , ALC, or ALN ). The necessary adaptations respectively
the overall applicability of our approach depend significantly on the expressivity.
In ALE , atomic negation (written as ¬A for A ∈ MC) is allowed in addition to
the usual FLE syntax. An adaption to this case not to difficult. We just sketch
the changes to be made in the major definitions and theorems:
• For A ∈ MC, add the deduction rules
∅ ⊸ {{A}, {¬A}}
tertium non datur (TND)
and
{A,¬A} ⊸ {{⊥}}
exclusiveness (EXC)
to the deduction calculus DR in Definition 3.3.
• The standard model from Definition 3.7 has to be minimally changed by
setting
∆(0) := {N ⊆ FLEnorm | N respects all k ∈ K,
for every A ∈ MC , either A ∈ N or ¬A ∈ N ,
⊥ 6∈ N}.
Mark that the “or” in the second line has indeed to be exclusive. With this,
all results concerning the standard model and completeness from Chapter
3 do easily propagate to ALE .
• In Chapter 4, we have to change Definition 4.4 as follows:
M0 := {A,¬A | A ∈ MC} ∪ {⊥}.
Furthermore we can add
{A,¬A}_{⊥}
for A ∈ MC to the immediately valid implications in Lemma 4.10 and Defi-
nition 4.11, respectively.
With this minor changes, all results from Chapter 4 remain valid.
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• The algorithm description in Chapter 5 and the considerations with respect
to termination in Chapter 6 can stay unabridged for ALE .
As to DLs including disjunction (like ALC or ALN ), the case is different. In
particular, the distinction cumulated clause vs. implication would be futile in
such a DL, since any cumulated clause can be transformed into an implication
by incorporating the conclusion disjunction into the attributes.
In the case of ALN , we even lose the property described in 2.6: For every
i > 0, we have infinitely many semantically distinct ALN concept descriptions
of maximal role depth i. Thus, a stepwise procedure as presented in Chapter 4
would have to be based on another “measure” on the concept descriptions.
In general, DLs equally expressive as (or more expressive than) ALC would force
an even more drastical blowup in the attribute numbers from one exploration
step to the next. Moreover, an according exploration algorithm would present
questions to the expert that are mainly difficult to understand and cope with (see
the according remark at the beginning of Chapter 2).
Thus, we think that it might be a better strategy to stick to FLE as “explo-
ration language” and treat information of a more complicated structure as static
background knowledge.
9.6 Applications apart from Ontologies
Depending on how the roles are interpreted, various applications of the proposed
techniques seem possible also in areas hardly connected to ontologies. We will
name just two: process exploration and epistemic exploration.
9.6.1 Process Exploration
We could interpret the entities of our universe ∆ as possible states of a system.
MC could be interpreted as properties which those states can have or not. MR
could be seen as repertoire of actions. (δ1, δ2)IRR would mean that the system can
be transferred from state δ1 to δ2 by action R. Then,
−→
K -subsumption statements
in some DL would be just a description of the system’s dynamic behavior.
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Figure 9.1: Context K0 and according concept lattice.
Example 9.15 Imagine, we would like to specify a cassette recorder. Let
MC := {Playing, Silent, FastForward, FastRewind, NoMovement}
describe the possible attributes of a state and
MR := { ◮ , ◮◮ , ◭◭ ,  , }
be the actions to be taken by pressing a corresponding button or just waiting
some time. The formal context in Fig. 9.1 describes the directly “observable”
states the device can be in.
All actions except are functional. So, as explained in Section 9.1, we can work
without all existentially quantified attributes and
A
.⊥ (as we know
A
.⊥ ≡−→
K
E
.⊥ ≡ ⊥). The reduced set M1 is shown in Figure 9.2. In the sequel, we substi-
tute the attribute names
E
.(FastForward⊓Silent),
E
.(FastRewind⊓Silent),
and
E
.(NoMovement ⊓ Silent) by their
−→
K -equivalent variants
E
.FastForward,
E
FastRewind, and
E
.NoMovement.4
Then, K1 has to be explored; see Figure 9.3 for the interactions taking place. For
better readability, the concept names have been abbreviated and some redundant
attributes deleted from the implications. Therefore, collecting the confirmed
implications does not yield a genuine stem base as described by Duquenne and
Gigue, nevertheless it is an implicational base.
4In general, in concept descriptions of the shape
E
R.
d
C, the set C could be substituted by
a subset D ⊆ C with
d
D ⊑−→
K
d
C for better readability.
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⊥ Playing Silent FastForward FastRewind NoMovement
◮ .Playing ◮ .Silent ◮ .FastForward ◮ .FastRewind ◮ .NoMovement
◮◮ .Playing ◮◮ .Silent ◮◮ .FastForward ◮◮ .FastRewind ◮◮ .NoMovement
◭◭ .Playing ◭◭ .Silent ◭◭ .FastForward ◭◭ .FastRewind ◭◭ .NoMovement
 .Playing  .Silent  .FastForward  .FastRewind  .NoMovement
A
.Playing
A
.Silent
A
.FastForward
A
.FastRewind
A
.NoMovement
A
.⊥
E
.⊤
E
.(FastForward⊓Silent)
E
.Playing
E
.(FastRewind⊓Silent)
E
.Silent
E
.(NoMovement⊓Silent)
Figure 9.2: Reduced attribute set M1.
Figure 9.4 shows the concept lattice generated by the acquired implicational
base. Many facts can be directly read therefrom, e.g. that in any case after
some waiting, the device will be silent (
E
.Silent ≡−→
K
⊤) or that, if the device is
silent, it will be so further on, if no action (except waiting) is taken (Silent ≡−→
K
A
.Silent).
Before continuing with greater role depths, note the following: Obviously, many
attributes are found to be redundant in the previous step (for instance all at-
tributes at the bottom of the diagram which are
−→
K -equivalent to ⊥). Thus, it is
possible to carry on with a set of attributes containing no attributes which are
−→
K -equivalent to a conjunction of others.5 Figure 9.5 shows the concept lattice
corresponding to the implicational base found in the exploration step belonging
to maximal role depth 2 with just the “relevant” attributes.
Summa summarum, this example shows that the proposed exploration technique
can also be used to describe discrete dynamic systems. In particular, it could
assist a system engineer to specify the dynamic behavior of a system that (s)he
is just developing.6 This might help avoiding that during specification certain
cases are not taken care of.
5This directly corresponds to column reducing the context K1 after finishing the according
exploration step and taking the reduced context’s attribute set as new set M1 for the generation
of M2.
6In fact, when the termination criterion from Chapter 6 is reached in step n, the corres-
ponding n-limited standard model corresponds to a – generally non-deterministic – automaton
with exactly the specified behavior.
9.6 Applications apart from Ontologies 103
No asked implication answer
1 ∅_⊥ no: s1
2 ∅_{Pl, ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si, no: s2
E
.Pl,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
3 ∅_{ ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si no: s3
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
4 ∅_{  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤} no: s4
5 ∅_{  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤} yes
6 {Pl}_{ ◮ .Pl, ◮◮ .FF, ◭◭ .FR,
E
.Pl} yes
7 {Si}_{NM,
A
.NM,
A
.Si} no: s5
8 {Si}_{
A
.Si} yes
9 {FF}_{ ◮ .Pl, ◮◮ .FF, ◭◭ .FR,
E
.FF} yes
10 {FR}_{⊥} no: s6
11 {FR}_{FR, ◮ .Pl, ◮◮ .FF, ◭◭ .FR,
E
.FR} yes
12 {NM}_{
A
.NM} yes
13 {  .Si, ◮ .Pl}_{ ◮◮ .FF} yes
14 { ◮ .Si}_{ ◮ .NM, ◮◮ .NM, ◭◭ .FR} yes
15 { ◮◮ .FF}_{ ◮ .Pl} yes
16 { ◮◮ .FR}_{⊥} yes
17 { ◮◮ .NM}_{ ◮ .NM, ◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR} yes
18 { ◭◭ .FF}_{⊥} yes
19 { ◭◭ .NM}_{Si, NM, ◮ .Pl, ◮◮ .FF} yes
20 {
A
.⊥}_{⊥} yes
21 {
A
.Pl}_{⊥} yes
22 {
A
.Si}_{Si} yes
23 {
A
.FF}_{⊥} yes
24 {
A
.FR}_{⊥} yes
25 {
A
.NM}_{NM} yes
26 {
E
.Pl}_{Pl} yes
27 {
E
.FF}_{FF} yes
28 {
E
.FR}_{FR} yes
sI11 = {Pl, ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
sI12 = {Si, NM, ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤,
A
.Si}
sI13 = { ◮ .NM, ◮ .Si,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .NM, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
sI14 = {Si, NM, ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .NM, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
sI15 = {FF, ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.FF,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
sI16 = {FR, ◮ .Pl,  .Si,  .NM, ◮◮ .FF, ◮◮ .Si, ◭◭ .FR, ◭◭ .Si,
E
.FR,
E
.NM,
E
.Si,
E
.⊤}
Figure 9.3: Protocol of the exploration step for role depth 1.
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◮◮ .Silent
◭◭ .Silent
E
.⊤
E
.Silent
E
.NoMovement
Silent
A
.Silent ◭◭ .FastRewind
◮ .Playing
◮◮ .FastForward
NoMovement
◮ .Silent
◮ .NoMovement
◮◮ .NoMovement ◭◭ .NoMovement
FastForward
E
.FastForward
FastRewind
E
.FastRewind
Playing
E
.Playing
◭◭ .FastForward
◭◭ .Playing
◮◮ .Playing
◮◮ .FastRewind
◮ .FastRewind
◮ .FastForward
 .FastForward
 .Playing
 .FastRewind
⊥
A
.⊥
A
.Playing
A
.FastForward
A
.FastRewind
Figure 9.4: Concept lattice representing L1.
Silent
NoMovement
E
.(Silent ⊓ ◭◭ .FastRewind)
◭◭ .FastRewind ◮ .Playing
E
.(Silent ⊓ ◮ .Playing)
E
.(NoMovement ⊓ ◭◭ .FastRewind)
A
. ◭◭ .FastRewind
E
.(Silent ⊓ ◮ .Playing)
◮ .NoMovement
FastForward
Playing
E
.(NoMovement ⊓ ◮ .Playing ⊓ ◭◭ .FastRewind)
FastRewind
◭◭ .NoMovement
E
. ◭◭ .NoMovement
E
.(NoMovement ⊓ ◮ .Playing)
A
. ◮ .Playing
E
.( ◮ .Playing ⊓ ◭◭ .FastRewind)
E
.(Silent ⊓ ◮ .Playing ⊓ ◭◭ .FastRewind)
Figure 9.5: Concept lattice representing L2.
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9.6.2 Epistemic Exploration
It is well known that there is a tight connection between DL and modal logics
(see [Sch91]). (Multi-)modal logic has also been used to describe epistemic phe-
nomena, i.e., settings where we have agents that know something about their
environment or each other. Here, we will shortly explain the basic ideas for this
(formulated in DL-style notation).
Let A be a set of agents. In a binary power context family
−→
K , interpret
• ∆ as a set of states the world can be in,
• MC as a set of facts that might hold in a certain world state or not, and
• MR := A as the agents’ “indiscernibility” relations, connecting world states
that cannot be distinguished by the respective agent. Obviously, all role
names from MR then have to be interpreted as equivalence relations.
If we see
−→
K in this way, the composed concept descriptions would have to be
understood as follows:
A
A.C would be read as “agent A knows that C” and
E
A.C
would mean “agent A considers C possible”.
Hereby, it becomes apparent that the provided methods could also be applied to
cases where aspects of communication and belief of several agents are considered.
Again, relational exploration could help in specifying (resp. axiomatizing) such a
setting.
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unvollstõndigen Wissens. Dissertation, Shaker Verlag, 2001. 93
[Ho99] Horrocks, I., Sattler, U., Tobies, S.: Practical reasoning for expressive
Description Logics. In: H. Ganzinger, D. McAllester, A. Voronkov
(Eds.): Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Logic for
112 Bibliography
Programming and Automated Reasoning, pages 161–180, LNAI 1705,
Springer, 1999. 71
[HST00] Horrocks, I., Sattler, U., Tobies, S.: Reasoning with individuals for
the description logic SHIQ. In: D. MacAllester (Ed.): Proceedings
of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction, pages
482–496, LNAI 1831, Springer, 2000. 87
[HR00] Huth, M., Ryan, M.: Logic in Computer Science. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000. 59
[Kr98] Krauße, R.: Kumulierte Klauseln als aussagenlogisches Sprachmittel
für die formale Begriffsanalyse. Diploma Thesis, TU Dresden, 1998.
21, 31, 33
[Kri63] Kripke, S.: A semantical analysis of modal logic I: normal modal
propositional calculi. In: Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 9, pages 67–96, 1963. 45
[MGvH04] McGuinness, D.L., van Harmelen, F., OWL Web Ontology Language
Overview, World Wide Web Consortium, 2004,
http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-owl-features-20040210/. 86
[NoMG01] Noy, N.F., McGuinness, D.L.: Ontology Development 101: A Guide
To Creating Your First Ontology. Technical Report KSL-01-05,
Knowledge Systems Laboratory, Stanford University, CA, 2001. 86
[Po94] Popkorn, S.: First Steps in Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press,
1994. 39
[Pra79] Pratt, V.R.: Models of program logics. In: Proceedings of the Twen-
tieth Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, 1979. 40
[Pre00] Prediger, S.: Terminologische Merkmalslogik in der Formalen Begriff-
sanalyse. In: G. Stumme, R. Wille (Eds.): Begriffliche Wissensverar-
beitung: Methoden und Anwendungen, pages 99–124, Springer, 2000.
62
113
[Ru03] Rudolph, S.: An FCA Method for the Extensional Exploration of
Relational Data. In: A. de Moor, B. Ganter (Eds.): Using Concep-
tual Structures: Contributions to ICCS 2003, pages 185–198, Shaker
Verlag, 2003. 61
[Ru04] Rudolph, S.: Exploring Relational Structures via FLE . In: K.E.
Wolff, H.D. Pfeiffer, H.S. Delugach (Eds.): Conceptual Structures
at Work, ICCS 2004, pages 196–212, Huntsville, USA, LNCS 3127,
Springer, 2004. 61
[Sa03] Sattler, U.: Description Logics for Ontologies. In: A. de Moor, W.
Lex, B. Ganter (Eds.): Conceptual Structures for Knowledge Creation
and Communication. ICCS 2003, Dresden, Germany, LNCS 2746,
Springer, 2003. 86
[Sch91] Schild, K.: A Correspondence Theory for Terminological Logics: Pre-
liminary Report. In: Proceedings of of the 12th International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI’91, pages 466–471, 1991.
105
[Sm68] Smullyan, R.: First-Order Logic. Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York,
1968. 45
[Wi97] Wille, R.: Conceptual Graphs and Formal Concept Analysis. In: D.
Lukose, H. Delugach, M. Keeler, L. Searle, J. Sowa (Eds.): Concep-
tual Structures: Fulfilling Peirce’s Dream. ICCS 1997, pages 290–303,
Seattle, USA, LNCS 1257, Springer, 1997. 25
[Zi91] Zickwolff, M.: Rule Exploration: First Order Logic in Formal Concept
Analysis. PhD thesis, TH Darmstadt, 1991. 92
Versicherung
Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe
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